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Ken Rutherford
CISR Director
 Here at CISR, our team is busy planning the 13th Senior Managers’ Course (SMC), which will take place in Biograd na 
Moru, Croatia, from 20 March to 7 April 2017. With the help of our local partner, the Croatian Mine Action Centre, CISR 
will implement a course designed specifically to address the needs of senior managers working in greater Southeast Europe 
as the region’s mine action programs undergo planned transitions. The course in Croatia will be our third regional SMC 
(Tajikistan in 2014 and Vietnam in 2015) since we began implementing the regional format in 2014; we hope to facilitate 
many more over the coming years.
In this issue of the Journal, we turn our attention to Libya in our Spotlight section, where Damir Djakovic and Katarina 
Cvikl Balić from ITF Enhancing Human Security examine the explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination response 
in Libya. And Nikolaj Sondergaard from DanChurchAid discusses the organization’s partnership with Lebanese authori-
ties on facilitating explosive ordnance disposal training for Libyan authorities. 
In our Feature section, we focus on small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) and conventional weapons destruction. In 
their article, “Gendered Vulnerabilities to Small Arms in South Central Somalia,” Abigail Jones (Danish Demining Group), 
Nicola Sandhu, and Lucas Musetti (Gender and Mine Action Programme) assert that a better understanding of gender- 
related behaviors is needed to encourage positive behavior change with regard to SA/LW and argue that future analyses and 
activities should be designed and implemented with sensitivity to gender, tribe, clan, age, and wider community relations 
in South Central Somalia. 
Furthermore, we have a fascinating article for this issue’s special report from Mette Eliseussen and John Rodsted 
(Safeground) on the Solomon Islands. Through photography and interviews with Islanders, the authors report on the ERW 
contamination left over from World War II that still significantly affects Islanders’ lives, vocations, and safety, as well as the 
islands’ topography, specifically its endangered coral reefs. 
Looking ahead, Brad Alford and Michael Kennedy from Janus Global Operations, LLC preview our upcoming issue on 
improvised explosive devices (IED) with their article “Adapting the ERW Community to Combat IED Threats.” I am very 
excited for issue 21.1, which will be published in March 2017, and will feature IEDs and pressure plate IEDs. As the num-
ber one cause of military casualties for many nations, these weapons continue to pose an increasing threat to civilians in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and are now becoming an increasing threat in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.
Also in 21.1, our Spotlight section will focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the end of the Bosnian War in 
December 1995 and the Balkan floods of May 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to suffer from landmines and ERW 
contamination. Having toured the country with Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997, this country and its lingering effects 
from landmines and ERW is something very close to my heart. We encourage individuals, NGOs, and all those working in 
humanitarian mine action to submit articles on lessons learned and the ongoing challenges for programs in this region.  
http://www.jmu.edu/CISR
improving lives since 1996.
James Madison University | Center for International Stabilization and Recovery | MSC 4902 | Harrisonburg, VA 22807
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Editorial
The Role of Research in Mine Action: 
A Response to Gasser
by Ian G. McLean, Ph.D. [ Consultant ] and Rebecca J. Sargisson, Ph.D. [ University of Waikato ]
S ome years ago, a businessman came to me and said that he would like to start commercially farming lob-sters, something that had not been attempted at the 
time. His key question was, “How long will the development 
research take?” 
“I would think two to four years before a scaling-up exercise 
to make it commercially viable,” I answered.
Looking genuinely surprised he replied, “Really! I was think-
ing it should take about two weeks.”
This anecdote portrays a problem that emerges in almost 
every area of human enterprise. Those-who-do want and need 
to do right now. Those-who-create need time to design, build, 
and prove their creation. The time scales are fundamentally 
incompatible. Russell Gasser refers repeatedly to this problem 
in his editorial in issue 20.1 of The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction.1 He also commits clearly to the side of 
the doer. His argument: the role of researchers (in mine ac-
tion) is to service the needs of practitioners. They should do 
so quickly, cheaply, and with careful attention to the specific 
needs of the moment. 
Gasser argues that incremental research (IR) is more ben-
eficial than research into new technologies. As defined by 
Gasser, IR consists of improvements in design and/or pro-
ductivity of equipment already in use. He points to the metal 
detector as a tool that was improved significantly over time 
by manufacturers through incremental improvements. Of 
course, it is unlikely that the manufacturers were improv-
ing their products specifically for mine action, which is only 
a small part of their market. Rather, mine action benefitted 
from developments that improved a tool for multiple appli-
cations. Those improvements would have emerged from re-
search, albeit hidden from the view of operational demining. 
Gasser states that much of the research in mine action has 
not directly benefitted the industry. However, researchers have 
broader goals than addressing specific and current problems. 
For example, research on de-
tection of landmines and un-
exploded ordnance (UXO) by 
animals may (or may not) ben-
efit demining at the time, but 
the lessons learned from that 
research can cross over into 
other endeavors. Examples 
include mine detection rats 
re-tasked to detect tubercu-
losis, or dogs, which are well 
known explosive and drug detectors that can also detect can-
cer, weeds, or bed bugs.2,3,4,5,6 A key benefit of research is that, 
successful or not, it leads to unanticipated advances and fur-
ther developments in the same or related fields. In this sense, 
all research is a process of “incremental improvement” and 
does not necessarily seek “breakthroughs” as Gasser claims.1
The issues with humanitarian mine action that Gasser de-
scribes from the 1990s were key reasons for establishing the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) in 1998. Humanitarian demining was an emerging 
profession, and there was considerable variation in the quality 
of the end product (mine-free land). Some technologies, such 
as mine detection dogs, needed to be better understood, and 
there were safety issues with human deminers. A combination 
of quality control through standards and research was needed 
to stabilize the industry and improve confidence. 
The GICHD established itself as a research leader by employ-
ing professional researchers to manage projects and work with 
consultants. It ensured that the results of that research were 
communicated to the industry through multiple channels in-
cluding written reports, face-to-face meetings, field-based 
conferences, and training videos. Most of Gasser’s examples 
refer to proposals and developments from more than a de-
cade ago. Much of the international interest in the landmine 
issue in the 1990s and early 2000s can be attributed to Diana, 
“A key benefit of research is that, successful or not, it leads to 
unanticipated advances and further developments in the same or related fields. ”
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Princess of Wales, and the signing of the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC). It is not surprising that develop-
ers of new technology that might (or might not) have a dem-
ining application siezed the opportunity to seek funding for 
their projects. After all, research is an enterprise and is sub-
ject to the ebbs and flows of societal trends, just like any oth-
er business. However, most money budgeted by governments 
and donors for research must be spent on research. It is not 
appropriate to imply that the money spent on high-tech devel-
opments was somehow taken away from operational demin-
ing, as that money was never available to operations anyway. 
Competition for research funding is intense, and there were 
presumably opportunity costs in that some other research ac-
tivity was not funded when the money went to a demining ap-
plication. That alternative might not have had anything to do 
with demining.
Nor is it appropriate to suggest that the research was not 
beneficial, even if it did not result in a useful demining appli-
cation. In his second point, Gasser states that research should 
improve equipment that is already in use. He refers to a failed 
project and notes that the limited learning from it did not ben-
efit deminers. Innovative research is not a process with guar-
anteed outcomes, as it involves exploration of the unknown. 
Failure is frequent, and a good researcher will learn from that 
failure. The IR advocated by Gasser is cautious, limited in 
scope, and minimizes innovation. True, its outcomes are gen-
erally more assured and its failings less costly. But the reality 
is that both incremental and innovative research are needed if 
genuine advances are to be obtained. 
In his fourth point, Gasser argues that the people who re-
viewed complex research proposals 20 years ago were either 
academics or military personnel, neither of whom understood 
humanitarian demining. The “wrong” projects were support-
ed as a result. While there is some truth to the first part of the 
argument, he fails to link decisions of the past with the sit-
uation today, and we struggled to find any relevance to cur-
rent realities in his arguments. The people who made those 
decisions no doubt believed they were the best decisions at the 
time. Retrospective criticism devalues their hard work with-
out adding any value to future decision making. 
However, Gasser is right that cynicism about the value of 
research was rampant in the industry at the time, and this edi-
torial indicates that it has not waned. The deep gulf between 
practitioners and researchers captured in the anecdote at the 
beginning of this commentary is no more easily bridged today 
than it was in the past. Researchers struggle to find the time to 
promote the results of their work beyond standard reporting 
(papers and presentations) and tend to assume that role will 
be taken up by others. The GICHD recognized that problem 
and invested significant resources into building that bridge, 
although with only partial success. 
In his conclusion, Gasser asks for a community of prac-
tice and better promotion of low-tech ideas that were devel-
oped and implemented on a local level. The latter proposal 
appears to be similar to the equipment catalogues produced 
regularly by the GICHD since 2003 but with additional, non- 
commercial ideas from the field included. Realistically, it 
should be people who work for support organizations such as 
the GICHD who capture those ideas and transfer them else-
where during their work programs. The notion of a communi-
ty of practice was trialed in several ways by Håvard Bach over 
some years, but those initiatives foundered on the very reali-
ties of demining practice that Gasser describes. 
Gasser ends with a question about funding discrepancies. 
We argue that the discrepancy is mostly a myth, as money 
spent on high-tech products was unlikely to have been avail-
able to demining practitioners. A likely explanation for the 
funding biases described by Gasser is that projects research-
ing incremental improvements to standard demining tools 
were of relatively low cost. There are published descriptions of 
such research from the time of primary interest to Gasser.7,8 If 
more was needed, we suspect that funding restrictions were 
not the reason for its absence.  
See endnotes page ##
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RBM and Theories of Change
by Russell Gasser
Editorial
G ive me your money; I’m busy doing things” is not the most convincing fundraising appeal. Instead, “Look at the difference our program has made to 
the lives of the people that were helped” is far more likely to 
get a positive response. The overall purpose of mine action is 
to improve people’s lives and livelihoods, to reduce casualties, 
and increase compliance with political commitments like the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Although 
this is widely known, standard reporting excessively includes 
information on how many people received risk education, 
how many square meters of land were cleared, or how many 
people attended a training session. In other words, they report 
activities instead of outcomes. This information tells the do-
nor that the mine action organization was busy but does not 
tell donors whether their money made positive, long-term dif-
ferences in beneficiaries’ lives, nor does it help donors under-
stand if the work was good value for money overall. To make 
a difference, implementing organizations need to know what 
success looks like and how to report it correctly. Even more 
important is the need to learn from experience, avoid repeat-
ing errors, and identify good practices and clever solutions for 
future use. Successful mine clearance is not measured by how 
many mines were removed but by the overall impact on the 
beneficiaries, the local communities and nations where they 
live, and how much the organizations involved were able to 
learn and implement continual improvement.
It’s not enough to be busy. Risk education only makes a dif-
ference if as a result people change their everyday behavior. 
Clearing farmland only makes a difference if local people pro-
ductively use the land once cleared. It’s tempting to measure 
time spent, but what really matters are results. This means 
that success can only be measured well after a mine action in-
tervention is completed.
This is not a new issue. Results-based management (RBM) 
started about 50 years ago. In the 1960s and 1970s, when na-
tional governments realized that it was not useful to measure 
social welfare programs by how much money they spent; New 
Public Management began measuring the results instead. 
RBM uses the same ideas and is experiencing a donor-driven 
resurgence. Unless donors continuously insist on using RBM, 
a cycle occurs where RBM is promoted with great enthusiasm 
and then gradually forgotten over the space of several years. 
Once time, money, and effort are spent on programs to ensure 
that RBM is successfully implemented, organizations tend to 
return to business as usual, and the focus on RBM is reduced 
or lost without pressure from donors.1
RBM is a method of ensuring quality management (QM) 
for donor funding. The very widely used International 
Organisation for Standardisation ISO 9001 approach is based 
on QM for customer-supplier relationships. Quality is de-
fined as “making sure that customer expectations are met or 
exceeded.”2 The underlying thinking is that a business with-
out satisfied customers has two choices: improve quality or go 
bankrupt. Going out of business because local beneficiaries 
are unhappy is not often part of the donor-funded approach. 
In donor-supported programs, implementers normally spend 
other people’s money according to an overall plan that the 
field-partner did not write (perhaps a national plan) in order 
to deliver goods or services that will help people whom the do-
nor does not know and will never meet. No single customer- 
supplier relationship exists that can be implemented for over-
all QM or to measure value for money. In other respects, the 
ISO 9001 method and the seven core principles of the 2015 
“
Figure 1. The results-based methods pocket toolkit.
All graphics courtesy of author via resultsbased.org.
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version can be used to improve the quality and value of donor-
funded work through RBM and QM.
One of the new phrases for RBM is theories of change, which 
describes and summarizes how the intervention will bring 
positive changes to people’s lives. It describes why spending 
donor money will lead to activities in the field, and why this 
will improve the lives of local people, whereas the work plan 
outlines how this will happen.
Although there is an argument among academics about the 
exact definition, theories of change for mine action as well as 
weapons management and destruction activities are evidence-
based and have three, widely-accepted core parts:
1. Results chains describe the elements that links in-
puts to results and are often drawn as a set of five 
or six boxes in a row (i.e., a results chain diagram).
2. Causal links represent “if this, then that” cause and 
effect evidence of why change will happen.
3. Assumptions about the context of the intervention 
that are necessary for success.3
All three must be included in a theory of change. A change 
model diagram is not a theory of change by itself.
Historically, planners wrote about the hypothesis of the in-
tervention.4,5,6 Most donor-funded programs are, in essence, 
social science experiments. However, instead of working with 
volunteers (or rats) in a lab, we are spending real donor mon-
ey to achieve behavioral changes in the lives of real people. 
Ideally, if the project delivers the planned activities, then peo-
ple will change their behavior. This is so familiar that plan-
ners and implementers sometimes forget it is an experiment. If 
we deliver risk education, then people will change their high-
risk behavior. If we clear this land, then people will use it to 
grow food. If we train people in planning skills, then a bet-
ter national plan will not only be written but also implement-
ed. Sometimes we make a false assumption that project inputs 
will automatically lead to the desired results. For example, a 
project must actually verify that people change their behavior 
after receiving risk education in order to show that the theory 
of change is correct. Typically, this can only be done long after 
the end of a short-term project, which is often a problem when 
donors want evidence of success immediately. A full year of 
an agricultural planting and harvesting cycle may be needed 
to show that the cleared land was put into productive use. The 
deeply ingrained idea that mine clearance has an impact as 
soon as the land is handed over needs to change. Similarly, do-
nors should understand that the evidence of success they need 
cannot immediately be produced as soon as funding ends.
Training projects that teach planning skills are a good ex-
ample. Considerable time and many different people outside 
of the project may be needed to achieve the desired result, such 
as a well written and adopted national plan. Implementing the 
plan after it’s adopted is even further removed from the ob-
jective of the training. Because someone finishes the initial 
training does not guarantee that they will eventually write a 
plan that is implemented. Maybe the person finds another job 
soon afterward, and the plan is never written. Maybe the plan 
is written but rejected by the government. In these cases, the 
impact of the training project will be zero despite delivery of 
the planned activities.
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Figure 2. Mine action results chain diagram.
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Similarly, recording the number of people attending an 
RBM course does not indicate that an organization is fol-
lowing an RBM approach. Success occurs when the orga-
nization yields behavior change by using RBM (outcome). 
As a result, the organization is transformed into a more ef-
ficient, responsive system that learns and improves (long-
term impact).
Result level names Intended changes Indicator difficulty
Impact or Strategic Objective Changes to beneficiaries, lives at a
community or society level
Hard.
Long delays.
Often very indirect information.
External factors very important.
Unrealistic in less than three years.
Intermediate Outcome
or
Medium-term Outcome
Change in behavior by people
influenced indirectly
Moderate to hard.
Can be indirect or very indirect.
Delay after activities end.
External factors will be important (attribution issues).
May include qualitative and hard to analyze.
Important for determining success.
Immediate Outcome Change in behavior by people
directly in contact with outputs
Moderate.
Short delay.
Usually directly available.
External factors quite important.
Often quantitative or pseudo-quantitative.
Important for determining success.
Output Anything we make or buy Easy or moderate.
Needs to be designed into activities.
Equivalent to Kirkpatrick level 2 evaluation.
Activity What we do Directly available from project management
information - in well organized activities,
minimal effort needed.
Does not indicate success.
Inputs Quantity of resources used Standard accountancy and audit.
Table 1. Key indicators in mine action.
Actual projects are never simple and are often unable to 
deliver exactly what was intended in the planning phase. To 
account for this, we identify the key assumptions on which 
the planning logic depends. These external assumptions are 
issues that are beyond the control of the project. Typical as-
sumptions include a stable political situation, the cessation 
of armed conflict, and the provision of adequate office space, 
Typical
IMPACT
Economic
Political 
APMBC, CMC
Health
Wellbeing
Health
Economic
Political 
APMBC, CMC
Health
Economic
Economic
Typical
OUTCOME
INDICATOR
Land in
productive use
Value of crops
Injuries averted
Anxiety
reduced
Injuries averted
Number of UXO
reported.
Injuries averted
Anxiety
reduced
Number of
decisions/plans
improved by IM
GIS information
Typical
OUTPUT
INDICATOR
Square metres
of safe land
UXO destroyed Number of
people
informed
Number of
tons (or
items) safely
stored
More and/or
better
information
ACTIVITY Land release Explosive
Ordnance
Disposal - EOD
Risk Education
- MRE
Ammunition
Safety
Management
ASM (PSSM)
Information
management
and GIS
Table 2. Difficulty of collecting data for mine action indicators.
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salaries, and computers for planning staff by the national au-
thorities so that staff do not seek other jobs. The availability of 
the necessary tools and supplies to start food production on 
cleared land is another common assumption.
Some RBM specialists argue that knowing how to measure 
the success of a result should be the starting point of any plan-
ning process. Unless everyone involved from donors to benefi-
ciaries can agree on the definition of success, and the project 
has the means to recognize long-term success, there is a risk 
that the intervention will accidentally support failure. Unless 
success is clearly understood, defined, and measured, it can-
not be properly separated from failure. Being busy is not a 
measure of success. Before starting field work and even be-
fore making detailed plans, project participants and funders 
need to define success and measure the situation. Before and 
after measurements are essential in order to illustrate that the 
project has made a difference. A single measurement at the 
end of a project cannot show that there has been a change. 
If the benefits cannot be identified or if the project does not 
include the necessary resources to analyze the benefits after 
activities have ended, it is not possible to justify claims of suc-
cess. Hard work and optimism for good results is not a strat-
egy. Positive changes have to be attributable to the activities 
that were funded, not just a fortunate coincidence.
Measuring the inputs to a project, the activities complet-
ed, and the resulting outputs is a matter of administering, ac-
counting, and auditing, and should be straightforward in a 
well-run organization. In contrast, measuring outcomes (be-
havior changes in other people) and impacts (long-term soci-
etal level changes) cannot be done directly and requires the 
use of indicators to demonstrate what is happening. The pur-
pose of indicators is to understand why the project developed 
as it did, to improve upon the project, learn from the experi-
ence, and report the project’s results. John Mayne, a leading 
RBM specialist, wrote “the aim of measurement is to acquire 
some insight and develop some comfort that the program is 
actually having an impact.”7 Understanding and improve-
ment is the main goal, not justifying activities to a donor. 
Identifying the difference that was made to the lives of ben-
eficiaries and the value for money that donors can expect is es-
sential; planning begins by first defining success. Donors 
increasingly expect this information and will prefer to fund 
implementers who include it. However, the biggest advantage 
of RBM is learning how to work better, how to avoid or solve 
problems, and how to learn and reuse solutions and skills. 
See endnotes page 66
Further information about the results chain 
diagram, theories of change, and indicators can be 
found on the author’s website: resultsbased.org.
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GENDERED VULNERABILITIES  
TO SMALL ARMS IN  
SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA
by Abigail Jones [ Danish Demining Group ], Nicola Sandhu, and Lucas Musetti [ Gender and Mine Action Programme ]
FEATURE
S
omalia is a very young nation demographically; es-
timates place half the population under the age of 14 
and less than five percent over the age of 60.1 A large 
portion of the population grew up during incredible civil in-
stability and violence, making exposure to armed violence an 
ever-present prospect. Further, the presence of more than one 
million displaced persons and refugees exacerbates the diffi-
culties of protecting vulnerable groups from violence.
Key factors contributing to armed violence and preva-
lence of small arms in Somalia include clan and subclan ri-
valries over resources; the 20-year breakdown of the federal 
state that lead to the importance of clan or subclan identity 
for survival; marginalization of nonpastoral clans and non-
Somali tribes; external funding for extremist Islamic ideology 
and the presence of groups such as al-Shabab; as well as lack 
of a legitimate outlet for justice and grievances. In addition 
to these factors and despite government efforts toward civil-
ian disarmament, ownership of officially registered firearms 
in Somalia is legal, which has contributed to the prevalence of 
weapons in the country. 
Weapons ownership is attached to masculinity in Somali 
culture, and boys will sometimes receive a weapon as a symbol 
of manhood.2 According to a 2015 Danish Demining Group 
(DDG) impact assessment, young men aged 13 to 30 are often 
seen as the main perpetrators of armed violence, especially as 
they are the most at risk for recruitment into armed groups in-
cluding al-Shabab; Islamic State group; Galgadud, Khatumo 
State, and other clan militias. Due to the lack of employment 
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)/Danish Demining Group (DDG) small arms risk education training in 2015.
All photos courtesy of Abigail Jones.
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opportunities, young men are increasingly resorting to crim-
inal activity such as carjacking, extortion, kidnapping, and 
assassinations.3 Young men in Somalia are also known to 
use weapons to rape, or commit other acts of sexual violence 
against women.4
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO GENDERED   
 VULNERABILITY TO SMALL ARMS
In humanitarian mine action, gendered daily routines and 
mobility patterns expose people to landmines differently, 
and evidence suggests this is also the case with small arms 
in South Central Somalia. Secondary research indicates that 
the more significant danger posed to men from small arms 
is related to the idea that weapons are linked to masculini-
ty. In Somali culture, owning a weapon is related to status, 
and firearms are directly linked to the role of protector. For 
Somali men, this involves protecting family, clan, livestock, 
and livelihood, especially in pastoral communities. Given the 
lack of a formal justice system, protecting the clan can also in-
clude revenge violence on those who attack clan members. The 
justice-system vacuum has been filled with traditional Somali 
or Xeer law, which demands armed retribution if arbitration 
over a slain clan member, usually blood money, fails to mate-
rialize. However, only men (15–45) are allowed to be targeted, 
as women, children, and the elderly are considered off limits.3
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests the activities 
that put men at risk of accidents involving firearms are dis-
tinctly gendered. Men are often injured as a result of improper 
weapons handling or storage—a result of insufficient training. 
Peer pressure is a key factor motivating younger men to han-
dle and use firearms in unsafe ways. DDG staff highlighted 
the fact that unsafe storage—for example keeping the weapon 
and ammunition together—can lead to accidents.4 
Alternatively, Somali women reportedly have a very dif-
ferent exposure to weapons as, in Somali culture, they do 
not typically own firearms. Most women who do are either 
widows or wives of men who left the family and their guns 
behind for their sons to use when they are older. Apart from 
these scenarios, women are primarily exposed to firearms 
through their role as keeper of the household, where they 
have the responsibility for any firearm within the home. 
This leads women to view firearms as higher risk within the 
home than their male counterparts do.2 In the 2015 DDG 
impact assessment in South Central Somalia, 25.6 percent of 
female respondents in Banadir cited domestic violence in-
volving firearms as one of their primary safety and security 
concerns. DDG staff in South Central Somalia highlighted 
examples of unsafe weapons storage in places accessible to 
children, as well as storing the weapon loaded and without 
DRC/DDG small arms risk education training in 2015.
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the safety catch on, which has led to ac-
cidental discharges.
THE GENDERED EFFECTS OF  
 SMALL ARMS INCIDENTS
For the household head, whether male 
or female, an inability to work and sup-
port the family due to a disability caused 
by a small arms incident can lead to sig-
nificant psychological suffering and iso-
lation. In addition, it can lead to family 
breakup and divorce if a man can no lon-
ger provide for his wife and children. In 
the case of women, the significant differ-
ence is that a woman who gets disabled 
by a small arms incident can also be-
come more vulnerable to rape or gender- 
based violence. Her injury can result in 
the husband taking an additional wife 
if she is not perceived as physically able 
to carry out her domestic tasks. With 
girls, securing a marriage partner will 
be extremely challenging due to negative 
perceptions of disabilities in the com-
munity. For boys, it is reported that dis-
ability can cause social isolation, which 
can lead to substance and drug abuse 
and, in some cases, suicide.4
AVAILABILITY OF DATA TO   
 SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT
To provide evidence of the different 
effects of small arms on women, girls, 
boys, and men, an analysis of data dis-
aggregated by sex and age is essential, 
which includes data on firearm owner-
ship, firearm-incident reporting, and ca-
sualties. At present, significant gaps exist 
in the availability of quantitative data.
In 2007, the Small Arms Survey 
ranked Somali firearm ownership per 
capita at 66 of 178 countries.5 However, 
due to ongoing insecurity and access 
challenges, tracking the exact number 
of small arms in Somalia is extremely 
difficult since firearm ownership is le-
gal, but no central or local records ex-
ist to show how many are circulating.3 DRC/DDG small arms risk education training in 2015.
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DRC/DDG small arms risk education training in 2015.
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In a context where the federal government does not con-
trol the entire territory, and the local population has little 
confidence in state institutions, data compiled on reporting 
of firearm-related incidents to the police will not reflect the 
problem’s true extent. Data compiled through the 2015 DDG 
impact assessment showed that in South Central Somalia a 
relatively low percentage of the population would report if 
they were a victim of crime or a violent encounter: Abudwaq 
(51.8 percent), Gedo (37.5 percent), and Banadir (63.2 percent). 
In addition, the reporting of firearm-related incidents to po-
lice varied across the different geographic areas: Abudwaq (20 
percent), Gedo (63 percent), and Banadir (24 percent). Within 
these figures, female respondents were less likely to report the 
incident to the police.
DDG states that most victims of firearm-related violence 
are men between the ages of 17 and 38 years.2 Yet accurate 
data on incidents involving small arms that lead to injury or 
death is not available. In 2015, DDG attempted to track this 
data in Puntland by visiting individual hospitals in Ayn, Bari, 
Karkar, Mudug, and Nugal as well as through liaison with the 
Ministry of Security. However, this data was not disaggre-
gated by sex and age, and at the time of writing, no such ef-
fort had been made. Also notable is that, for many families in 
South Central Somalia, significant access constraints—such 
as a lack of financial resources to travel to the hospitals—can 
further distort the accuracy of the data.
CONCLUSIONS
The lack of accurate sex- and age-disaggregated data on 
firearm ownership, firearm-related incidents, and casualties 
means that the argument on gendered vulnerability to small 
arms is drawn from secondary research, perception data, and 
qualitative information. The Gender and Mine Action 
Programme (GMAP) and DDG believe that to encourage pos-
itive behavior change with regard to small arms, a better un-
derstanding of gender-related behaviors drawn from an 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data is needed. This 
will allow organizations carrying out small arms risk educa-
tion (SARE) to identify target groups, develop appropriate 
risk communication messages, and measure the results of 
SARE initiatives. At the same time, based on indications 
showing specific gender and diversity vulnerabilities to small 
arms, GMAP and DDG argue that future analyses and activi-
ties should be designed and implemented with sensitivity to 
gender, tribe, clan, age, and wider community relations in 
South Central Somalia. 
See endnotes page 66
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ADAPTING THE ERW COMMUNITY 
TO COMBAT IED THREATS 
by Brad Alford and Michael Kennedy [ Janus Global Operations, LLC. ]
FEATURE
I
n Iraq and other regions soon to be liberated from the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), recovery and 
stability efforts are hindered by improvised explosive 
devices (IED), which threaten civilians returning home and/
or assisting with reconstruction. According to Relief Web, 
the Anbar Provincial Council “discourage[d] the premature 
return of internally displaced persons (IDP) to Fallujah due 
to the remaining IEDs left behind by the Islamic state of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS) militants.”1 This threat, coupled with the 
consequences of an asymmetrical conflict, has changed the 
operating environments encountered by organizations that 
respond to explosive remnants of war (ERW). In order for 
post-conflict explosive hazard search and removal activities to 
stabilize these areas, organizations must be prepared to adapt 
to the dynamic and challenging environments that are associ-
ated with improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD). 
With origins seated in specialized military and police counter- 
terrorist explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, IEDD incor-
porates experience from a wide spectrum of conflicts and forms 
a distinctive branch of the wider EOD discipline. The practice is 
often difficult and costly as it requires specialized equipment and 
advanced training. The difficulty and ambiguity of the IEDD 
tasks, along with the potential catastrophic consequences of 
accidental detonations, have long made it an exclusive activity 
for military or special police units. In recent years, the prev-
alence of the IED threat has resulted in IED awareness and 
search skills training to the vast majority of personnel deployed 
in conflict operations. Since an IED is considered a weapon 
from combatants, organizations that conduct IEDD are faced 
with similar security challenges as militaries and local police. 
This integrated understanding of explosive hazards and their 
operational impacts has reached ERW removal organizations. 
This prompts the question: how can existing mine action orga-
nizations and personnel adapt to address this threat and effec-
tively support stability operations?
DISTINGUISHING MINE ACTION FROM IEDD
ERW removal and mine action organizations have a wealth 
of experience operating in post-conflict areas to remove 
explosive hazards. Some organizations have categorized IEDs 
as a type of improvised landmine in order to catalogue and 
address it within the confines of their scope and mandates. 
However, IEDs can vary greatly, even in the same opera-
tional theater. This variation can be in the form of a simple 
pipe bomb used by ISIL as a hand grenade to a multi-switched 
device incorporating multiple main charges. 
The battlefields of the 20th century were often open areas, 
fought between traditional force-on-force opponents using 
conventional ordnance, which included mines that were 
placed as both barrier obstacles, as well as nuisance mine-
fields, targeting vulnerable points such as bridge abutments 
or landing strips. The vast majority of these mines were non-
electrical and recognized and approved render safe pro-
cedures (RSP). They were often placed in areas that could 
withstand a high order detonation, if demolition in situ was 
required. Due to the materials and methodology used in the 
creation of these devices, historical means of recognition and 
IED charge fitted for anti-lift. 
All photos courtesy of Janus Global Operations.
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the ability to reference technical publications to determine a 
suitable RSP are less valuable. Not only have the means of dis-
posal changed, but search procedures can differ when work-
ing with IEDs. For example, a road that might have a crush 
wire IED will likely have a switch, which is difficult to detect 
with traditional demining procedures unless search teams 
are equipped with the training and equipment specific to IED 
threats. These factors reduce the suitability for a traditional 
demining approach and require the adaptation of new train-
ing and procedures, which are principally taken from recent 
military experience.
ISIL and groups like the Taliban are now aware that non-
military actors will be used to search and clear areas after 
they were forced to withdraw. It serves their interest to make 
clearance organizations’ tasks difficult. It is critical that orga-
nizations understand that IEDs in liberated areas are still 
serving ISIL’s purpose of harassing and restricting movement 
through death or injury. Incorrectly categorizing all IEDs in 
liberated areas as abandoned or legacy devices or as simple 
conventional mines creates further risk to life and property. 
When ISIL places IEDs in houses, schools, government build-
ings, and other critical infrastructure points, they are actively 
targeting the credibility of the local authority. The inability 
to dispose of these IEDs can adversely affect the confidence 
that the local populace has in said authority. This can lead to 
discontent, which can devolve into further violence. This has 
proven to be an effective Taliban tactic, technique, and pro-
cedure (TTP) against the government of Afghanistan. The 
Taliban has utilized IEDs to actively disrupt the government’s 
ability to provide the fundamental services required to affirm 
its authority.
Traditionally, most community-based ERW removal orga-
nizations were considered noncombatants. Community-
based mine action organizations in Afghanistan remove 
devices left behind from previous wars. The Taliban and ISIL 
view IEDs as weapons, and disposing of these 
weapons causes insurgents to react with hos-
tility and see mine action organizations as 
combatants. In Afghanistan, mine action orga-
nizations are advised to never destroy IEDs 
and instead report them to local authorities 
to avoid violent reactions from the Taliban. 
Organizations that are conducting IEDD oper-
ations must adapt to this important risk and 
provide the proper security and risk manage-
ment from being targeted by insurgent groups. 
LEARNING FROM EOD EXPERIENCE
Organizations involved in post-conflict ERW removal can 
benefit from the experience of  IEDD operators in approach-
ing these items with philosophies and principals specific to 
IEDs as opposed to mines. Traditional unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) clearance operations relied heavily on technical publi-
cations of recognized RSPs for specific conventional ordnance 
and military booby trap switches. Since each encountered IED 
can vary greatly in terms of materials and deployment, the 
traditional ERW RSPs counter the nature of the improvised 
threat. Militaries adapted to this by adopting a philosophy of 
approaching each IED as a unique threat and have applied this 
in their training.
IED RSPs do not always mirror UXO procedures. For exam-
ple, IEDD principles encourage standoff distances and devices 
such as remote control vehicles (RCV), unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAV), or hook and line kits to conduct circuit disrup-
tion from a safe area. Additionally, due to the preponderance 
of electrically initiated IEDs, water-based disruptors are often 
used to achieve neutralization. These can include improvised 
general emplaced disruptors made from water bottles and det-
onating cord. 
Why conduct an RSP versus destruction? There might be 
opportunities to dispose of an IED in situ, where bulk explo-
sives are used to cause a high order detonation of the device. 
Although this can be the safest and easiest option, destruc-
tion in situ can present problems. Common obstacles include: 
the unavailability of explosives, potential damage to the sur-
rounding area, and unclear legal authorities to conduct high 
order detonations in the host country. Destruction of an IED 
in situ can also expose an operator to a viable device for lon-
ger than necessary. For example, when dealing with a pres-
sure plate IED, if the IEDD operator intends to destroy it in 
situ, the operator needs to achieve intimate contact between 
the IED’s main charge and an explosive donor charge (unless 
Suicide IED belt found in Ramadi, Iraq.
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they have access to a shaped charge or large amount of bulk 
explosives). If the pressure plate is adjacent to or directly above 
the main charge, the operator will need to spend a consider-
able amount of time feeling for the main charge while in close 
proximity to the firing switch. The resultant explosion may 
also interfere with other IEDs in the vicinity, thus increasing 
the hazard. Therefore, even if an IED can be destroyed in situ, 
the operator might still elect to follow RSPs and disrupt the 
power source remotely or semi-remotely. 
DEFINE AND UNDERSTAND THE THREAT
The pressure plate IED (PPIED) became synonymous with 
Afghanistan. Although the Taliban also deployed vast num-
bers of devices that were self-detonated, or detonated via radio 
control or command wire, the PPIED often posed the greatest 
challenge to Coalition Forces. Although many variants were 
deployed, the general tactic was identical. The device was con-
cealed and buried in the ground with a simple electrical cir-
cuit utilizing a firing switch created via two contacts held in 
the open position by spacers. When the weight of the target is 
applied to the pressure plate, the contacts come together, the 
circuit completes, and the device detonates.
Previously in Iraq, PPIEDs were used on a small scale 
against Coalition Forces. ISIL, however, has used PPIEDs and 
other victim operated IEDs (VOIED) in vast quantities. These 
have often been emplaced in a defensive manner in order to 
restrict avenues of approach as the Iraqi Army begins their 
offensive ground operations to liberate ISIL-controlled areas. 
They often deployed PPIEDs in a manner similar to conven-
tional barrier minefields, linking natural obstacles. These 
devices, like those in Afghanistan, continue to utilize a simple 
firing circuit with a normally open switch. 
A key factor for organizations to consider during IEDD 
operations is that the batteries powering many IEDs have 
unusually long life spans. Many IEDs are designed to not 
draw any current from the IED’s power source. When com-
pared to the shorter life of a standard nine-volt battery in a 
house smoke alarm, ISIL devices may be viable for several 
years after they are emplaced. The number of IEDs that have 
functioned in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq 8–10 months 
after the area was liberated clearly demonstrates that batteries 
contain enough voltage to detonate these devices.
ISIL has taken the effectiveness of pressure plate IEDs and 
has sought to develop devices and tactics to further optimize 
VOIEDs in the urban environment. As identified in Al Anbar 
Province and other areas, ISIL made extensive use of a variety 
of IED types in homes, schools, factories, and infrastructure 
like water, power, and sewage plants. These include trip wires, 
crush switches, hydraulic switches, anti-lift triggers, and a 
variety of pull switches. The vast majority of these VOIEDs 
normally employ an open firing switch that functions as a 
result of a door being opened, an object being moved, or a per-
son walking through a doorway. This again means that there 
is no electrical draw of the power source and the device can 
stay viable for an extensive period of time.
TRAIN FOR THE THREAT
IED Search and Detect Operations. Training in open-
area, route, building, and infrastructure search and detect 
(SnD) procedures is essential to meet the challenges posed in 
UXO scrap from a single sector at Al Anbar University, Iraq.
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urban post-conflict zones. These procedures take a systematic 
approach depending on the terrain and environment while 
also assessing the intent and capability of the device user. This 
approach can vary considerably from the use of instruments 
on un-prepared surfaces to utilizing visual checks in build-
ings and on prepared surfaces. 
A key difference between SnD and manual minefield clear-
ance is the adoption of IED threat assessment into planning 
the safest and most appropriate search procedure. For exam-
ple, the crush wire switch is difficult to detect both visually 
and via search equipment. Instead, the adopted search proce-
dure should be focused on initially avoiding areas where the 
crush wire switches are likely laid. Instead, the searcher locates 
other components of the IED, such as the main charge. Once a 
searcher detects a possible device, it is marked and reported to 
an IEDD operator for an RSP or disposal.   
IED Disposal Operations. IEDD-qualified staff need to 
be conversant with both conventional ordnance and the 
full array of IEDs. As IEDs vary considerably, training must 
introduce the student to various devices instead of special-
izing in one specific device type. Detailed training in explo-
sive theory (including the use of homemade explosives), 
IEDD philosophies and principles, task scene management, 
and threat assessment and execution all need to be covered 
specific to IEDD. The current International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) do not sufficiently prepare an operator for 
the dynamic situations they will face in the field. A unique set 
of standards must be developed for IEDD.
Local personnel hired to aid and (eventually) assume the 
responsibility of IEDD in a post-conflict area must be properly 
vetted and cleared by the local government before receiving 
any IEDD training. The technical knowledge that is acquired 
through training is a restricted defense commodity, and it can 
be exploited to create IEDs. Proper vetting and monitoring of 
employees by the IEDD organization and open communica-
tion with the local authorities is vital to ensure that this tech-
nical knowledge is not given to insurgents.   
Risk Education. The need and scope for risk education is 
evolving, and it is critical that it be delivered in an effective 
and controlled manner. With vast numbers of residential, 
commercial, and critical infrastructure buildings targeted by 
groups like ISIL, risk education needs to be immediate. Large 
numbers of displaced persons are waiting for the fighting to 
end before returning to their homes. Educating the returning 
populace to access their homes safely is required as search-
ing and clearing every house in an affected area is imprac-
tical. However, this is not meant to replace IED search and 
clearance by the recognized organization. If IEDs are deemed 
highly likely or are confirmed, then the house, business, or 
area must be assigned by a coordinating body to an IEDD 
organization or local police with the capacity to implement 
SnD operations safely.
Equip to Meet the Challenge. At the conceptual level, 
IEDD operations employ similar equipment as conventional 
EOD operations. However, the equipment needed for IEDD 
operations is not only more advanced but can often be subject 
to export restrictions. Organizations must realize the limita-
tions of equipment designed to combat different threats and 
must employ disruptors that can double as dearmers, hook 
and line kits that are fit for purpose, and personal protective 
IED search operations at Al Anbar University, Iraq.
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equipment (PPE) that is sufficient for the task. Seeking alter-
nate equipment as a means of circumnavigating problems 
posed by acquiring controlled equipment is dangerously irre-
sponsible. Without the proper equipment, the risk that opera-
tors face is greatly increased. 
An equipment area that is in need of further detailed con-
sideration in the future is the use of mechanical clearance to 
include tillers, flails, ploughs, and excavators. As with mechan-
ical minefield clearance, these machines can be used to facili-
tate the rapid creation of a confirmed hazardous area, enabling 
the start of the search and clearance phase that will likely still 
need to be conducted. IEDs that were encountered in Iraq have 
typically had main charges with a net explosive weight (NEQ) 
ranging from 10 to 20 kg (22 to 44 lb). The damage that these 
charges would cause, even to armored and remotely operated 
machines, severely limits their effective use. Whereas the use 
of machinery has a place within IEDD, organizations need to 
carefully develop standard operating procedures (SOP) to uti-
lize machines effectively. 
CASE STUDY: RAMADI, IRAQ 
Janus commenced IEDD operations in Ramadi, Iraq, in 
April 2016. Janus first established an operations base and 
recruited local deminers to retrain as searchers. These per-
sonnel were trained in IED SnD as well as battlefield area 
clearance (BAC). International technical advisors with IEDD 
experience were employed to conduct training, mentoring, 
and operational EOD/IEDD tasks. The challenges initially 
faced by the project were similar to those often encountered by 
ERW eradication organizations in the post-conflict environ-
ment. These included the requirement to build relationships 
with local stakeholders and operating in an evolving situation 
with no clear tasking authority.
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS IN RAMADI
Explosive hazard threats from IEDs. ISIL employed a wide 
range of both conventional ordnance and IEDs. Therefore, in 
addition to the requirement to clear significant quantities of 
Coalition and Iraqi Army UXO, the task of combatting ISIL’s 
IEDs was immense in scale and filled with many uncertainties. 
The majority of the United Nations Development Program’s 
initial priority tasks focused on searching and clearing critical 
infrastructure. Explosive hazards could range from a victim- 
operated crush-wire IED, to an improvised pipe bomb, to a 
conventional 81 mm mortar. In addition, large air-dropped 
munitions including numerous variants of 500 lb aircraft 
bombs were regularly encountered and posed a direct threat 
to the local population.
ISIL has also developed an extensive range of projected 
IEDs (from rockets and mortars to large improvised rocketed 
assisted mortars). A large portion of these are direct copies of 
conventional ordnance, incorporating cast-and-milled main 
bodies with homemade explosive fill and a detonating cord 
booster. The fuze is often an improvised copy of a military 
fuze, incorporating a plain detonator modified by the attach-
ment of a percussion cartridge often taken from a 0.22 caliber 
cartridge. All of these improvised munitions need to be han-
dled with care due to the unknown state of the explosive fill 
and functionality of any built-in safety features.
The wide range of explosive threats present in Ramadi 
reinforces the need for comprehensive training and opera-
tional approaches. Destruction of IED belts and pressure 
plates in situ is difficult due to the inability of acquiring 
adequate high order explosives. In Iraq, the only organiza-
tion that can deliberately initiate a high order explosion is 
the Iraqi Army. This scarcity of high order explosives com-
bined with the need to prevent further damage to Ramadi’s 
critical infrastructure necessitates RSPs. Each RSP is differ-
ent depending on how the device was emplaced and the indi-
vidual situation that the operator encounters. It is critical to 
ensure that the Iraqis are trained for this task as local capac-
ity is built. SnD is more complex than destroying IEDs in 
place in an open, permissive environment. They must master 
the concepts of IEDD.
FULL SND vs SURFACE BAC
Prior to deployment, Janus developed a SnD training pack-
age based around the anticipated IED threat. Once deployed, 
these were further amended to take into account the signifi-
cant number of non-pressure plate IEDs that were encoun-
tered, such as crush wire IEDs, trip wires, and anti-lift 
devices. Thus the courses developed for the students included 
basic explosive theory, device component parts, land service 
ammunition recognition, search equipment, procedures, and 
individual search drills. Additional training was also pro-
vided on BAC procedures, which proved to be a key element 
in increasing productivity when the threat of an active IED 
could be discounted. 
Combined SnD and BAC training creates a higher level of 
productivity in many cases. In one case, a large water treat-
ment plant was occupied and cleared by the Iraqi Army with 
workers returning and starting operations at the site. Non-
technical surveys and some technical surveys were conducted 
in order to ensure that a surface BAC search could be safely 
conducted to locate conventional UXO and IED component 
parts. This adaptability in operations enabled a site to be 
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completed in approximately two days when full SnD might 
take two weeks.
STOCKPILE CLEARANCE AND EXPLOSIVE  
 HAZARD SPOT TASKS
After the Iraqi Army completed their ground assault of 
Ramadi they started the process of clearing the city of some 
of the IEDs left behind by ISIL. Often these were the devices 
that were placed in roads and the most significant build-
ings, therefore representing an immediate threat to military 
operations. These devices were then placed at the side of the 
road and formed uncontrolled stockpiles. These roadside 
stockpiles represented a significant explosive hazard. When 
the local population and construction workers returned to 
Ramadi without appropriate risk education, they started to 
add items to these piles. These items required detailed IEDD/
EOD procedures to confirm that they were safe to move to a 
central demolition site (CDS) for final disposal. 
The management of the deliberate clearance of the stock-
pile needed to be coordinated with a range of local and inter-
national stakeholders in order to achieve an adequate security 
cordon, evacuation of bystanders, and demolition. These 
stockpiles often represented an explosive hazard simply by 
the unstable nature of the homemade explosives and lack of 
basic explosive safety knowledge by the individuals that left 
the ordnance. For example, an electrical power source could 
be positioned adjacent to an electrical detonator that was 
still attached to a 20 kg (44 lb) IED main charge, which if it 
had functioned, could have detonated an additional 2,000 kg 
(4,400 lb) of explosives.
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
The use of IEDs by ISIL is immense and has changed the 
face of what ERW response efforts will look like in the region 
for some time. This threat shares characteristics with other 
conflicts across the world including Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, 
Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria. Acceptance of sound IEDD prin-
cipals is the cornerstone for organizations to develop effec-
tive programs. 
The environments in which organizations operate are 
also likely to continue to become less defined with f luctua-
tion in terms of stakeholders, armed groups, and the overall 
security situation. Groups such as ISIL are becoming more 
aware that after they leave an area, ERW organizations are 
deployed to clear explosive hazards. These organizations 
have become targets.
It is hard to quantify the lives saved and the utility provided 
by IEDD in square meters cleared or the number of devices 
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found. Educating the donor community about the highly spe-
cialized personnel and equipment required to meet this mod-
ern challenge effectively is an ongoing effort. We must accept 
the realities of limited funding yet still appreciate the critical 
importance that IEDD capacity brings immediately following 
a conflict. When the work and sacrifice of government militar-
ies concludes, the private sector and humanitarian actors need 
to ensure that populations can safely re-inhabit liberated cities 
and towns. Employing specifically tailored approaches to the 
unique scourge of IEDs is fundamental to the ERW commu-
nity and ultimately, the safety of civilians and operators alike. 
The asymmetrical conflicts of the 21st century no longer 
resemble the battlefields of the past. When ongoing conflicts 
end, ERW organizations will be required to clear the path for 
civilians returning to their homes. In order for these post-
conflict efforts to be successful, the ERW community must 
evolve to counter these threats. The IEDs that are left after the 
fighting ends in Iraq are testament to the modified tactics of 
the terrorist organizations. ERW organizations must adopt 
IEDD principles and practices in order for post-conflict 
recovery to occur. 
See endnotes page 66
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Honiara
Special Report:
Solomon Islands’ 
Explosive Legacy
T he Solomon Islands encompass over 900 islands scattered across the ocean north of Australia and east of Papua New Guinea. Many of the 500,000 in-habitants still live with unknown quantities of explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) left behind from combat between Japan and the United States during World 
War II. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) of both U.S. and Japanese origin remains on 
some of the nation’s atolls. Since the end of the war, sporadic clearance was under-
taken, including through Operation Render Safe, a joint clearance program between 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There 
have also been a number of commercial clearance projects. For the last five years, 
the international clearance organization Golden West Humanitarian Foundation 
(Golden West), supported by the U.S. Department of State, is working alongside the 
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force to address the problem on a more systemic scale. 
This operation focuses on heavily contaminated areas on the island of Guadalcanal.
by Mette Eliseussen and John Rodsted [ SafeGround ]
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Contamination in Solomon Islands 
On 22 January 1942, Japan dropped the first bombs 
on the Solomon Islands, and on 3 May of that same year, 
Japan occupied the country. Most foreigners were evac-
uated and those who remained took on roles as coast 
watchers with the Royal Australian Navy. With cru-
cial help from the local population, they kept Australia 
informed of the Japanese movements. During the first 
three months, Japan met no resistance and was able 
to construct an airfield on Guadalcanal. In response, 
U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi in an 
attempt to stop Japan from threatening their supply 
and communication lines to allies in the Pacific. The 
Solomon Islands campaign lasted over a year, killing 
over 24,000 Japanese and 1,600 U.S. soldiers.3 In 1945, 
Livingston is a constable with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force on New Georgia Island. When he receives a report 
of old ammunition and bombs, he investigates. “I find many old bombs. The farmers and fishermen report them to the 
police. They in turn report to Honiara (capital of the Solomon Island). The problem is distance, logistics, time and mon-
ey. The distances are great in the Solomon Islands and it takes time and money for the EOD team to be able to respond 
to all reports…”
Photo courtesy of John Rodsted.
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foreign military forces left behind sunken ships, burnt-
out tanks, abandoned stockpiles of weapons and am-
munition, large empty gun emplacements, and UXO.4 
During the Solomon Islands’ civil war, from 1998 to 
2003, combatants made use of many abandoned weap-
ons, which served as a ready source of deadly arms.5,6 
As a result of villagers becoming accustomed to han-
dling explosives, it is believed that dynamite fishing in-
creased during and after the conf lict.   
A significant factor hampering clearance efforts is the 
lack of reliable documentation of the WWII ERW con-
tamination. The only sources of information recorded in 
writing are accounts from reports and books on battles 
written by the various WWII military forces fighting on 
the Solomon Islands from which it is difficult to pinpoint 
ERW sites. Local islander knowledge is extensive albeit 
anecdotal, but not easily accessible to the national or in-
ternational community. 
International Response
Until recently, international awareness of ERW con-
tamination and its impact in the Pacific was incom-
plete, even within the mine action community. This 
is partially because international assistance in mine 
action is primarily driven by two international trea-
ties, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) and the 2008 Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM). As neither landmines nor cluster 
munitions are believed to be present in the Pacific, do-
nor countries and mine action operators prioritized 
Alec takes us for a walk into the mangroves and the Lever Plantation. This is where he hunts for bats and crabs. He al-
ways finds explosives and eagerly collects the small explosive pellets into a plastic bottle. His mother said as we left the 
village, “I am so scared when he leaves the village because I know he will find bombs. He always does. And how can I 
stop him from touching them when I am not with him?”
Photo courtesy of Mette Eliseussen.
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other regions, incorrectly assuming that the Pacific 
did not need humanitarian clearance and victim assis-
tance. Hence the problem has persisted for more than 
70 years since WWII ended.
In 2010, the first major change occurred when 
Pacific Forum Leaders tasked the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (PIFS) to assist in addressing the longstanding 
presence of ERW throughout the region. PIFS conduct-
ed a study of four affected countries in 2011 and found 
that ERW had the potential to impact local communities. 
Following this, the Pacific Forum leaders expressed con-
cern and called for assistance to address the significant 
contamination from WWII UXO in the Pacific. For some 
member states, this contamination was identified as a hu-
man security problem threatening public health, safety, 
and the environment.
In response, the Forum Regional Security Committee 
endorsed a regional UXO strategy in 2012 to assist mem-
bers with managing the negative impacts of WWII UXO. 
PIFS is now tasked to follow up with ERW-affected mem-
ber states. The priorities are Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, 
the Royal Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, and 
Vanuatu. This selection is based on the following crite-
ria: the lack of existing mine action in-country, the ex-
pressed interest and request for assistance, the level of 
contamination and its impact, and current bilateral ar-
rangements with mine action operators.7 
Incidents
There are no ERW-incident statistics in the Solomon 
Islands, as recording mechanisms are not in place. 
Because dealing with explosives is illegal, SafeGround, a 
nonprofit organization that works to help prevent and re-
duce the impacts of war and conflict, inferred that survi-
vors and relatives of survivors tend not to reveal whether 
the reason behind an accident was caused by handling 
explosives. Hence, many incidents are likely to remain 
unreported. However, according to Doctor Rooney at the 
national reference hospital in the capital city of Honiara, 
the hospital usually deals with five to six patients injured 
by ERW each year. The actual number of injuries per year 
is estimated to be much higher than this.
As injuries are often fatal, many people never reach the 
national hospital but instead die shortly after the accident 
and are buried in their local community without casualty 
data being recorded. Infrequently, incidents are reported 
in the news, but this usually only happens if the explo-
sion takes place near populated areas such as Honiara or 
other regional centers. In 2010, the Royal Solomon Island 
Police Force estimated that an average of 15 Solomon 
Islanders lose their lives to ERW each year.8    
Golden West has trained members of the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police Force in explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) methods. Golden West’s project manager, 
Paul Eldred, reports extensive trespassing by bomb har-
vesters into ERW-contaminated areas at Hell’s Point, 
which lies to the east of Honiara. On an almost daily 
basis, SafeGround researchers saw telltale signs of peo-
ple searching and scratching the ground for larger mu-
nitions, leaving behind smaller, less valuable munitions. 
Fishermen or in some cases specialized bomb makers 
who harvest the bigger bombs for explosives are the cul-
prits. Random digging patterns in the ground indicate 
that they may use metal detectors to find the bombs. 
Local residents who find bombs on their property will 
sometimes sell the ERW to bomb makers for a small find-
ing fee. 
Once the bomb makers extract the munitions, they 
cut the bombs in half with a hacksaw to expose the ex-
plosives within. Since many people who harvest ERW 
cannot correctly identify the different kinds of explo-
sives, they may inadvertently open a phosphorous shell, 
which explodes on contact with the air. Harvesters place 
any explosives that are successfully extracted in 300 ml 
drinking bottles. Using homemade fuses, the harvesters 
produce fish bombs that can be thrown into the ocean to 
kill and maim large numbers of fish. It is a risky but prof-
itable business. Although harvesting bombs is illegal, po-
lice are unable to take action without hard evidence.
For fishermen, homemade bombs are more efficient 
than nets or spears in terms of time spent and fish 
caught. However, using explosives is extremely risky 
and does extensive environmental damage. Fishermen 
using these bombs search for schools of fish and then 
gauge the depth at which the fish are swimming and 
how long to hold the bomb once lit before throwing it. 
When the fuse is ignited, it takes three to four seconds 
for the bomb to explode, but these are inexact estima-
tions that can lead to disastrous results. Many acci-
dents happen when bombs detonate too early, injuring 
or severing heads, hands, or arms. Detonations stun 
or kill the fish, but also destroy one of the Solomon 
Islands’ most precious resources: the coral reefs, which 
are seriously damaged if the explosive detonates within 
a six- to eight-meter radius of the reefs. Once the bomb 
detonates, the fisherman jumps into the water with a 
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net to catch as many fish as possible. However, many 
more fish are killed than are caught and either drift 
away with the current or sink into deeper water. Once 
impacted by explosives, the reefs take a long time to re-
grow and often remain permanently damaged.
Dynamite fishermen run little risk of being caught 
by the police. In high-speed powerboats and with an ar-
senal of fish bombs, they do not meet much resistance 
from unarmed police officers equipped with fewer and 
slower boats.
Environment
Extensive dynamite fishing has devastated lagoons 
and in some areas, such as Langalanga Lagoon in 
Malaita, there are no reefs or fish left. Some local com-
munities rate dynamite fishing as their top concern.9 
These reefs provide the Solomon Islanders with fish to 
eat. Eighty-four percent of Solomon Islanders live in ru-
ral areas, and 95 percent of the rural population depends 
on subsistence farming and fishing.10 Coral reefs cov-
er less than one percent of the world’s ocean floor and 
are one of the most biologically rich and economical-
ly valuable ecosystems. The Solomon Islands has diverse 
and interesting reef types, from narrow fringing reefs 
that border high island shorelines to rare, double bar-
rier reefs, patch reefs, and atolls. The Solomon Islands 
has the second highest diversity of coral species in the 
world, currently home to over 494 coral species with sev-
eral new species recently discovered.11,12,13 
People in island communities relay that dynamite fish-
ing is a common occurrence. Diving masters claim that 
they see up to 200 fishermen use explosives in waters 
Frank is a fisherman on Ngella Islands who lost his lower arm when fishing with explosives.
Photo courtesy of John Rodsted.
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around Ngella Islands every day. These fishermen boast 
about exceptional yields in just hours compared to the 
days needed to fill only one bin. Having sold the fish, they 
leave blasted reefs in their wake.
Reef growth rates vary from an estimated 0.8 to 80 mm 
per year depending on air and sea temperatures, wind 
speed and direction, salinity, tide levels, currents, avail-
ability of nutrients, algae, and the bottom surface. In the 
Solomon Islands, many people believe reefs may form 
in 20 to 40 years. However, the reality is that it can take 
much longer—even up to 10,000 years—for reefs to form 
from a group of larvae.14,15 Reefs blasted by dynamite pro-
duce large amounts of rubble, creating terrible condi-
tions for coral larvae which must attach to living reefs to 
start growing. Therefore reefs destroyed by bombing may 
not recover. In contrast, studies show that bleached reefs 
can regrow in only a few years because the structure of 
the reef is still intact and coral larvae may again use it as 
a starting point for regeneration.16
Economic Development
ERW contamination also affects economic develop-
ment in the Solomon Islands. Honiara remains heavily 
contaminated and telecommunication, water, and elec-
tricity companies face grave challenges when digging 
trenches and postholes. Australian technical consultant 
Nik West expressed shock at the level of ERW contamina-
tion when he started working with the Solomon Islands 
Electricity Authority. He quickly realized that everyone 
in Honiara considered running a metal detector over the 
area before digging to be normal. “Much of our work is 
laying power lines for the national electricity grid. We are 
Local boys come across munitions left behind by bomb harvesters located in one of the hunting areas on Lever Point, 
Russell Island.
Photo courtesy of Mette Eliseussen.
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always digging the earth to erect power poles and trench-
es to lay cables. We often unearth old bombs, both large 
and small, in this work. This area surrounding Honiara 
was hit by everything during the war… The end result 
is there is a very large degree of ERW in this land. We 
are always using detectors, but despite that, this last week 
one of my staff hit a large bomb with a backhoe and un-
earthed it. The bomb did not explode, but it terrified the 
backhoe operator and he ran away home and is scared to 
come back to work.”17 When these workers find a bomb, 
they call the police, and members of the police’s (EOD) 
team remove and dispose of the item.
Development projects are also struggling. Even in 
areas with less ERW contamination, construction 
projects may stall. There are uncertainties with regards to 
safe practices and the need for clearance before construc-
tion can begin. The construction of a new campus for the 
University of the South Pacific, a US$19 million dollar 
Asian Development Bank project, was delayed because of 
this issue. This highlights the need for national standards, 
which will create the base framework for the methodol-
ogy and quality assurance needed to commence clear-
ance in an effective and systematic way.
Clearance
There are nine Pacific Island countries affected by 
ERW but clearance operations are only underway in 
Palau and the Solomon Islands. In the Solomon Islands, 
Bombs and munitions may be found on the Solomon Islands anywhere there was fighting or military movement. Manny 
works as a timber cutter, farmer, and pig hunter. He relies on the forest and jungle for his livelihood. The mountains 
south of the Lunga River were occupied by the Japanese army to transport supplies before they pushed north to fight 
the Americans and Allied forces. Manny guided the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force EOD team to the munitions in the 
mountains. “When I work in these mountains I find many things; old munitions, crashed planes, guns, cannons, and equip-
ment. The bombs and munitions scare me. If I hit one by accident or lit a fire and one was underground, then I would be 
killed. There was a bigger pile than this before. Maybe they have been stolen or thrown in the bushes, I do not know.”
Photo courtesy of John Rodsted.
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Golden West’s mandate is to function as a training, 
research, and development organization. They work 
closely with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
and have trained an 18-man team in explosive ord-
nance detection and disposal. Their EOD experts re-
spond to reports from the general public within the 
vicinity of Honiara, but they currently have neither the 
budget nor the mandate to achieve full clearance in the 
Solomon Islands. 
The APMBC helped to bring the world together to 
clear the legacy of landmines and this effort has since 
expanded to include ERW as well. The Solomon Islands 
is a party to the APMBC, but they have yet to join the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the U.N. 
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) where 
Protocol V covers ERW and is highly relevant. However 
in April 2016, Minister Salato from the Solomon Islands 
Geneva mission participated, along with Australia and 
SafeGround, on an expert panel on ERW contamination 
in the Solomon Islands during a Protocol V expert meet-
ing in Geneva.  
There is hope that the donor community and mine ac-
tion operators will increase their assistance to help the 
Solomon Islands combat its ERW contamination in the 
near future. In 2014 and 2015, with the support of 
Australian Aid and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
SafeGround conducted field research in the Solomon 
Islands. For over three months, staff spent time in 
Members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force EOD team prepare small munitions for an explosive demolition at 
Hell’s Point. During the war, Hell’s Point was a massive ammunitions storage area that caught fire. As the fire spread, 
soldiers evacuated and the area burned out of control for many days. Stored ammunition began to detonate, spreading 
munitions over a large area. The area was largely abandoned and the jungle finally took control. The area is very dan-
gerous and the ground is not suitable for farming due to the contamination. Hell’s Point is now home to the EOD team 
and school. Paul Eldred from Golden West Humanitarian Foundation says, “We have taken control of this area to try and 
secure it and keep the local people away from the dangers here. We have also set it up as our training facility and de-
molition range and we are systematically clearing the site of these munitions. The scale of the task is huge with an un-
known amount of munitions spread over a very large area. It’s not at all easy to deal with, but it is a great place to train. 
I am proud to say the EOD team members are some of the world’s top professionals when it comes to dealing with World 
War II munitions.”
Photo courtesy of John Rodsted.
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Members of the Royal Solomon Island Police Force EOD Team clear away the last of the 69 mortars that were reported 
on Hill 31 behind Honiara. Willy Basi, the local villager who notified the police of the munitions, said “I am very happy 
to see the bombs taken away. They are very dangerous for everyone, especially the children.”
Photo courtesy of John Rodsted.
Guadalcanal, Ngella Islands, Russel Islands, and New 
Georgia Islands, working closely with the Ministry of 
Police National Security and Correctional Services, 
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, Golden West, and 
PIFS as well as a number of local island community 
members. The main results of this collaboration are a re-
port, a documentary film, and a photographic exhibition 
available at: www.safeground.org.au/project/solomon- 
islands. 
See endnotes page 66
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Working from a Distance 
in War-Affected Libya
by Nikolaj Søndergaard [ DanChurchAid ]
A unique partnership between DanChurchAid (DCA) and Lebanese authorities facilitates explosive ord-nance disposal (EOD) training for Libyan authorities, 
who can now start their own national EOD teams and begin 
the clearance process.
Cluster bombs, rockets, grenades—virtually every form 
of bomb and type of ammunition—are scattered over large 
parts of Libya. Unexploded ammunition is killing children 
and adults; however, the Libyan authorities lack the capacity 
to clear these explosives, and the continued instability makes 
it impossible for international demining organizations to con-
duct clearance.
With funding from the European Union, DCA is collab-
orating with Lebanese and Libyan authorities to fly relevant 
Libyan officials to Lebanon, where they are receiving EOD 
training in Arabic. Maria Berwald Madsen, program manag-
er for DCA Libya describes the program:  “We have worked 
closely with the authorities in Lebanon for many years clear-
ing landmines and cluster munitions there, so it was natural 
to collaborate with them when we needed a place to build the 
capacity of the Libyan authorities.”
On 20 March 2016, 11 Libyans received EOD level 1 and 
level 2 training in Lebanon, funded by the European Union. 
The 11 participants were from the Libyan Mine Action Centre 
(LibMAC), the Libyan National Security Agency (NSA), po-
lice forensic officers, and army engineering corps. 
Successful Partnerships
DCA worked with a wide range of local partners in Libya, 
ranging from the Libyan army to small, self-started organi-
zations. In May 2011, it began operations in Libya, just three 
months after the start of the revolution. When DCA muni-
tions experts crossed the border between Egypt and Libya, 
they assessed the situation and started clearance activities. In 
the following years, this first tentative effort developed into a 
large country program with headquarters in Tripoli and local 
employees from many parts of Libya.
Regarding DCA’s work, Maria Berwald Madsen said, 
“Initially, we focused only on clearance activities led by our 
own people and with local deminers that we trained our-
selves. However, we expanded to also work with psychoso-
cial support mainly for children, capacity building of local 
authorities, armed violence reduction and a number of other 
initiatives.” In the summer of 2014, renewed fighting meant 
that DCA had to evacuate all international staff to Tunisia, 
where the program is managed. Luckily, DCA was already 
working through local partner organizations, and this ap-
proach has since been extended.
Assessment in 2011. 
Photo courtesy of Marcus Q. Rhinelander.
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EOD course in Lebanon, April 2016.
Photo courtesy of Tobias Selsnæs Markussen.
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ACT Alliance team helps Libyans deal with unexploded ordnance.
Photo courtesy of Paul Jeffrey.
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DCA’s 16 local partner organizations conduct active citi-
zenship, risk education, and psychosocial support as well as 
armed violence reduction activities. These organizations work 
directly with local DCA employees, while the overall manage-
ment remains in Tunisia. 
In discussing the many benefits of working through part-
ners, Maria Berwald Madsen says, “We want them to take 
charge of their development in the creation of safer and more 
resilient communities. They are the ones that are a part of the 
community, they are the ones that know what the needs are on 
the ground and how to respond to those needs.”
There are often challenges to working with new local orga-
nizations; many of them lack experience performing the work 
and running an organization. However, the benefits outweigh 
the drawbacks as local citizens have a reach within their com-
munities that international organizations lack.
From Libya to Lebanon
One of DCA Libya’s main objectives is to improve the safety 
of the Libyan people by clearing unexploded ordnance (UXO); 
however, this is a difficult task to complete from Tunis. When 
international ammunition experts could no longer enter the 
country due to the conflict and were unable to oversee clear-
ance operations on-site or train local authorities in clear-
ance tasks, DCA was forced to move these activities outside 
Libya. Most courses in Tunisia involve basic clearance and 
DCA teaches basic first aid in Libya.
Photo courtesy of DCA.
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Photos this page: A quiz competition between students in Libyan schools is meant to attract young people to school work and pro-
vide a break from thoughts of war.
Photos courtesy of Tobias Selsnæs Markussen.
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Workshops in Libyan schools use creative activities as a way for children to process their trauma.
Photo courtesy of DCA.
Libyan children are offered toys donated by LEGO in return for their toy weapons. 
Photo courtesy of Tobias Selsnæs Markussen.
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“We are dealing with bombs and explosives, so it’s impor-
tant that the students understand absolutely everything that 
the instructor says. The course would not have worked as well, 
if we had for example completed the course in Denmark,” ex-
plains Rahal, adding that none of the 11 Libyan students on 
the course knew any English.
However, there are quite a few differences in dialect for 
Libyan Arabic and Lebanese Arabic. Moreover, the field of 
EOD is characterized by many English phrases that cannot be 
directly translated into Arabic. Therefore, language was still a 
challenge during implementation of the program.
Another challenge encountered during implementation 
was the high level of training required. Participants were not 
used to intensive training and needed to study from morning 
to night six days a week while learning a significant amount 
of new material. This meant that three of the 11 participants 
failed the level 1 course and had to return to Libya before the 
level 2 course began on 17 April 2016. Eight participants suc-
ceeded in completing the level 2 course and graduated on 18 
May 2016.
safety training. High level EOD courses cannot take place 
in Tunisia, partly because DCA lacks sufficient registration 
in the country and partly because of Tunisia’s insufficient 
facilities and equipment.
Charmen Rahal, the planning and security manager 
for DCA Libya, proposed that the Libyan deminers fly to 
Lebanon and conduct training there in cooperation with 
the Lebanese security authorities. Rahal has a background 
with the Lebanese Mine Action Center (LMAC) and was 
the operations manager for DCA Lebanon. Rahal noted, 
“The Lebanese military have extensive experience in clear-
ing bombs after the conflicts with Israel. They work with 
clearing this stuff every day, so I knew they would be able 
to conduct the training at a really high level.”
DCA annually conducts EOD level 3 courses in Skive, 
Denmark, in cooperation with the Danish engineering reg-
iment, who provides equipment, facilities, and instructors. 
Luckily, the Lebanese authorities agreed to do the same. In 
addition to being closer to Libya, there were a number of 
other advantages to conducting a course in Lebanon (e.g., 
the common language).
On Mine Awareness Day in Libya, piles of toy weapons were traded in for LEGOs as part of a program to educate children on the 
dangers of weapons.
Photo courtesy of Tobias Selsnæs Markussen.
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Nikolaj Søndergaard
Communication Officer
DanChurchAid
Nikolaj Søndergaard is a Danish jour-
nalist and worked for various media 
before he came to DCA in 2013. Since 
then, he has worked as a communi-
cation officer with responsibility for 
covering DCA’s mine action activities.
The eight participants who passed are scheduled to attend 
an EOD level 3 course in Kosovo, where instructors from 
DCA and Danish Demining Group (DDG) will conduct the 
training. Rahal predicts that all of the eight new Libyan EOD 
experts can make a tangible difference to the Libyan people.
While eight new EOD experts may not sound like much, 
“each of these participants can go back to Libya and manage a 
team of deminers,” says Rahal. “Today there are many ERW in 
… Benghazi, but also around Misrata and Tripoli, resulting in 
many accidents. These people can go back and work directly 
on the ground removing UXO, which we will follow through 
our national staff in Libya. It will save lives. And we must do 
more similar training in the future.”
When asked why he wants the dangerous job of clearing 
bombs and ammunition, Mouez Miftah, one of the students 
completing the course responded, “Because I need to help the 
people. It is my country.” 
A large sign campaigning for a reduction in armed violence hangs on the side of a damaged building in Libya. The campaign was 
funded by DCA to inform Libyans on the dangers of weapons.
Photo courtesy of Tobias Selsnæs Markussen.
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Explosive Remnants of War 
Contamination Response in Libya
by Damir Djakovic and Katarina Cvikl Balić  [ ITF Enhancing Human Security ]
Abu Grain is a town located 106 km (66 mi) east of Misrata and 138 km (86 mi) west of Sirte with an es-timated population of 2,000 inhabitants. The town 
is known for its strategic road intersection connecting the 
Mediterranean cities of Misrata and Sirte with the desert dis-
trict of Jufra. Between February and March 2016, Abu Grain’s 
population fled as Islamic State (IS) group forces advanced 
into town in an attempt to expand control toward the west of 
its stronghold in Sirte. According to the Libyan Red Crescent, 
Abu Grain’s inhabitants mostly fled to Bani Walid, Misrata, 
and Tripoli.
While in control of Abu Grain, IS forces began to advance 
further west in the beginning of May 2016. However, they 
were stopped by Al Bunyan Al Marsous (ABAM) forces short-
ly thereafter at Sidada Bridge, only 6 km (4 mi) outside of Abu 
Grain, and open conflict ensued. After 
five days of clashes, ABAM regained con-
trol of Abu Grain on 11 May 2016, slowly 
pushing IS fighters back toward Sirte un-
til mid-June 2016, when ABAM entered 
the city.
Immediately after the conflict in 
Sirte, the Libyan Mine Action Center 
(LibMAC) sent a two-member team from 
the LibMAC Risk Education (RE) divi-
sion to Abu Grain to research explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) contamination 
in the area. The team assessed potential 
risks posed by ERW to the local popula-
tion who were expected to return to the 
village from internally displaced persons 
(IDP) camps. During a two-week period, 
LibMAC personnel collected informa-
tion on the present population numbers 
and whereabouts as well as on the de-
struction in Abu Grain and contamina-
tion from landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), and 
ERW. They were joined by LibMAC’s quality-assurance offi-
cer, allowing the team to compose dozens of non-technical 
M e d i t e r r a n e a n  S e a
Tunisia
L i b y a
Tubruq
Sabha
Tmassah
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Figure 1. Map of Libya.
Figure courtesy of CISR.
Area of Abu Grain in close proximity to the strategic intersec-
tion, May 2016.
All photos courtesy of LibMAC.
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surveys and hazard area information reports by mid-June. 
Reports were delivered to the Information Management 
System Mine Action database officer in LibMAC and are be-
ing processed further before being utilized as the foundation 
for future mine action operations.
Given the results of the initial assessment in Abu Grain—as 
well as data of widespread use of landmines, ERW, and signifi-
cant IED contamination in many parts of Libya— prevention 
of further devastation caused by explosive weapons will need 
to become the focus of mine action in much of the country. 
Explosive weapons are often used in cities, towns, and villages 
from which civilians fled but will likely return.
In the case of Abu Grain, it is believed a large majority of 
the population returned to the town by the end of July 2016. 
In order to help the returnees in recognizing the threats pres-
ent in their hometown, and to prevent significant loss of life 
and additional damage to homes and infrastructure, LibMAC 
launched a non-technical survey campaign in August 2016.
LibMAC’s RE division carried out urgent RE campaigns 
previously at the IDP Tawarga Camp in February 2016. 
Although LibMAC’s staff does not normally implement 
RE campaigns, there are possibilities for them to deliver in 
situations where no other Libyan implementing partner is 
present or available in the area. The RE campaign in Tawarga 
IDP Camp, delivered by five LibMAC representatives, trained 
25 IDPs who serve as focal points and will share the informa-
tion they learn with their camp in Tripoli. An ITF Enhancing 
Human Security RE technical adviser supported and over-
saw the campaign and training sessions. The ITF technical 
adviser developed strategic RE plans and carried out RE ca-
pacity building within LibMAC by implementing intensive 
on-the-job training.
Since 2014, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA) has supported capacity-building activi-
ties of the ITF technical adviser and of other ITF operations 
in Libya. Initially, ITF provided administrative and financial 
support to LibMAC and capacity building for the operations 
section, implemented through the employment of an explo-
sive ordnance disposal (EOD) technical adviser.
Like other Libyan implementing partners, ITF’s interna-
tional personnel withdrew from Tripoli in mid-2014 due to 
security concerns over anticipated armed conflict between 
various militias in the city. During this period of time, no 
Training delivered by LibMAC RE section staff in Tawarga IDP Camp in Tripoli, Libya (February 2016).
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Risk education materials recently developed for use in August 2016 in Abu Grain, Benghazi, and Sirte, Libya.
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organization other than Libyan military engineers had ac-
cess to perform clearance or battle area clearance (BAC) in 
the country. Since 2014, program operations are facilitated re-
motely with the ITF administrative coordinator and RE tech-
nical adviser on the ground in Tripoli.
Despite the extremely volatile situation, ITF ensures 
LibMAC receives technical support. Field conditions in Libya 
and the absence of international partners led those currently 
in Libya to devote more attention to remote training, ensur-
ing that LibMAC personnel (especially in Tunis) build much-
needed local expertise. Similarly, with hostilities continuing 
and clearance operations unable to continue, the focus shifted 
to helping local populations learn about the risks associated 
with ERW.
The RE technical adviser deployed in November 2015, 
which led to significant progress in LibMAC’s RE operations. 
Under the supervision and guidance of the technical advis-
er, a number of relevant supporting documents and strategic 
plans were developed, including necessary standard operat-
ing procedures for effective RE campaigning.
Risk education materials recently developed for use in August 2016 in Abu Grain, Benghazi, and Sirte, Libya.
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With very solid groundwork laid by the RE technical advis-
er, ITF envisions additional, stronger support for RE activi-
ties. Conscious of the risks posed by ERW in Libya, prioritizing 
education will involve providing more comprehensive, long-
term, and geographically widespread support for RE activi-
ties. Based on the assessment of LibMAC’s needs and in 
consultations with PM/WRA as the donor, ITF proposes to 
support LibMAC’s RE section to minimize the deadly impact 
LibMAC RE section chief during training sessions in Tawarga IDP camp in Tripoli, Libya (February 2016).
Katarina Cvikl Balićc’ 
Project Officer
ITF Enhancing Human Security
Zabry, Slovenia
Katarina Cvikl Balić joined ITF in 2015 
after working as a policy researcher for 
a nonprofit in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
focusing on the country’s post-
conflict reconstruction. Balić holds 
a Master of Arts in international 
development from the University of 
Manchester and a Bachelor of Arts in 
international relations from the University of Ljubljana.
of mines, ERW, and IEDs as much as possible while strength-
ening LibMAC’s operations division, as the national focal 
point for all operations must not be neglected. Nevertheless, 
much of the planning will largely depend on the security situ-
ation in the field and the possibilities for geographical expan-
sion of LibMAC and its overall access in Libya. 
Damir Djakovic 
Project Officer–Libya
ITF Enhancing Human Security
Zabry, Slovenia
Damir Djakovic is a humanitarian mine 
action professional with more than 
15 years of experience working on 
U.S. government and U.N. projects in 
Afghanistan, Armenia, Iraq, Libya, and 
Sudan. He joined ITF in January 2014 and 
serves as ITF project officer in Libya. 
Previously, Djakovic worked as business 
manager and technical adviser in Sterling International Group, 
DynCorp International, and RONCO Consulting Corporation. 
He holds a master’s degree in chemical engineering from 
the Military Technical Academy of Yugoslav Army.
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 Effectiveness and Impact of UNDP  
 Mine Action Support: Lessons Learned
by Charles Downs [ Consultant ] and Alan Fox [ UNDP Independent Evaluation Office ]
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has supported mine action in more than 40 countries 
since its first involvement in Cambodia in 1992. UNDP sup-
port generally focuses on the development of national mine 
action management capacities. In early 2016, the Independent 
Evaluation Office (IEO) of UNDP concluded the first global 
evaluation of the results of UNDP support in mine action, 
with particular attention to its effectiveness and impact.1 The 
evaluation reviewed documentation relating to all national, 
UNDP-supported mine action programs, in-depth desk re-
views of support to 14 countries, and background for field case 
studies of three national programs (Laos, Mozambique, and 
Tajikistan). It also included visits to two dozen communities 
in Laos (n=8), Mozambique (n=11), and Tajikistan (n=5)—all 
of which were previously mine-affected and where demining 
had occurred at least five years before the evaluation visit. The 
evaluation highlighted several important lessons regarding ef-
fectiveness of international support in mine action and pro-
vided important nuances to the discussion of impact in mine 
action. UNDP management accepted the recommendations 
addressed to it.2
Origin and Development of UNDP  
 Mine Action Support
Modern mine action began with the U.N. decision in late 
1988 to train and equip Afghans living in refugee settlements 
in Pakistan to return to their country to clear landmines. In 
1989, a U.N. coordination office was established to oversee 
the process, with national nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO) as the main operators; The HALO Trust was estab-
lished as the first mine action international NGO (INGO). In 
2002, the Afghanistan program was transferred to the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) for implementation 
by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 
Globally, the next mine action programs were established in 
Kuwait (1991) for clearance after the First Gulf War and in 
Central America (1992) for clearance of minefields resulting 
from internal conflicts. The former was conducted on a com-
mercial basis and financed by the Kuwait government, and the 
Organization of American States in cooperation with nation-
al armed forces supported the latter. UNDP was not involved 
with any of these mine action programs.
Initial UNDP involvement in mine action was a corollary 
of U.N. peacekeeping missions during the first half of the 
1990s (Cambodia, 1992; Mozambique, 1993; Angola, 1994). 
In these cases, peacekeeping missions were contracted for de-
mining services (i.e., road access, resettlement areas, etc.) and 
to train local personnel as deminers. These missions did not 
have a mechanism to continue financing or employing trained 
teams beyond the life of the mission, and looked to UNDP 
to recruit deminers and channel funding. In each country, 
UNDP established specific projects and organizations for 
this purpose—managed by UNOPS, which has continued 
to implement those projects for UNDP since 1995. UNDP 
gained further experience on a country-by-country basis in 
Laos (1995), as well as with the peacekeeping missions for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the mid-1990s. On 
the groundwork of an important multicountry study in 1997, 
the maturing international mine action community conclud-
ed that the national mine action center should not be an op-
erator to minimize the labor and budgetary implications—as 
well as potential conflicts of interest in allocation of funds—
and to insulate the national (or international) authority from 
liabilities.3 Other major NGOs that would have a global role 
in mine action joined The HALO Trust in the early 1990s: 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group), Handicap International (HI), 
and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
International civil society’s reaction to the lasting effects 
of landmine contamination in the aforementioned coun-
tries led to the 1997 adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
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Convention (APMBC), transforming international mine ac-
tion. First, it established an obligation for each mine-affected 
State Party to remove all known minefields from its territory, 
as well as a provision that each State Party in a position to do 
so would provide assistance for such efforts. Although the im-
plication was not immediately clear to all, this implied a long-
term effort to clear every mine rather than simply make each 
country safe. Second, the United Nations, NGOs, and com-
mercial demining firms understood that international mine 
action would continue for many years, and that they should 
organize themselves accordingly. UNMAS and the dedicated 
mine action units of UNDP, UNOPS, and UNICEF were es-
tablished during this period, as was the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the dedicated 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), 
and the institutional model of separating the national mine 
action entity for operational management from that of policy, 
as well as separating both from field operations, are all from 
this period. During the first years of the APMBC until the 
First Review Conference in 2004, most countries with histor-
ic mine problems established national UNDP-supported pro-
grams with the exception of those coming out of immediate 
conflicts, which more often had UNMAS-managed programs.
Initially it was expected that UNMAS would have opera-
tional responsibility for peacekeeping mine action programs, 
which UNOPS would implement to provide continuity, then 
hand over to UNDP as each program’s mission ended. This 
changed for several reasons:
1 . There were delays in UNDP picking up some national 
programs.
2. UNMAS staff believed they were more effective at re-
sponding to mine problems than UNDP or national 
bureaucracies.
3. UNMAS involvement typically was accompanied by much 
greater donor resources than those UNDP could attract.
Community maps in Mozambique showing contamination drawn by women.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.
46
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol20/iss3/1
47ISSUE 20.3 @ NOVEMBER 2016
An effective UNMAS program during this period was 
in Kosovo (1999–2001), in which the U.N. Mine Action 
Coordination Center coordinated the technical response and 
resources to largely resolve the mine problem without the na-
tional government. The international staff of UNDP mine ac-
tion support projects sometimes had to unlearn lessons from 
Kosovo in order to become mine action advisers rather than 
mine action managers to focus on developing national capaci-
ties to manage the respective mine action program.
National Ownership
Distinguishing the development of national ownership 
from the development of technical management capacity is 
important. UNDP has generally been successful in support-
ing institutionalization of national ownership—which is more 
comprehensive than developing national technical capacity—
and projects staffed and managed by nationals. National own-
ership is a question of government commitment rather than 
of staff passports. The evaluation identified a few essential as-
pects of national ownership:
* Formal establishment of the national mine action entity
* Inclusion of the national mine action entity in the regu-
lar government budget
* Inclusion of mine action in the national recovery and 
development plan
* Adherence to key relevant treaties (e.g., APMBC)
UNDP is particularly capable of developing a formal, in-
stitutional framework for mine action. Institutional support 
and capacity building are aspects of most mine action support 
programs and are commonly carried out by GICHD, UNDP, 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNMAS, bilater-
al donors, and also NGOs in some cases. However, in peace-
keeping contexts, the presence of UNMAS is generally due to a 
breakdown in government capacity, and it acts in substitution 
of government with that role somewhat begrudgingly accept-
ed. Governments do not change institutional structures to fit 
Community maps in Mozambique showing contamination drawn by men.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.
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the needs of a peacekeeping mission, which is generally con-
sidered to be an infringement of national sovereignty.
UNDP has not been universally successful in develop-
ing government ownership. In some cases—including Laos, 
Mozambique, and Tajikistan—the national mine action entity 
continued for more than a decade as a UNDP project with-
out proper institutionalization or inclusion in the national 
budget. Although conducted in agreement between the gov-
ernment, UNDP, and some donors, such situations delayed es-
sential actions for long-term sustainability and created donor 
doubt regarding national commitment.
Support and Development of National   
 Mine Action Management Capacity
Based on lessons learned in the late 1990s, the evaluation 
team identified the key management capacities that the na-
tional mine action center requires as information manage-
ment, strategic planning, quality management of operations, 
and resource mobilization. Expertise in each area can be de-
veloped through specific training and experience. However, 
trained personnel may not remain in the national entity once 
the international project ends.
UNDP’s comparative advantage in institutional develop-
ment is seen by many as not carrying over to the technical 
side of demining. Close working partners supplied much of 
the specific technical support provided under the UNDP um-
brella. In the early years of UNDP mine action, UNOPS sup-
ported the implementation services and developed rosters of 
experts and suppliers. One or more NGOs or specialized firms 
then provided operational support for demining. GICHD 
supports operational policy development in many countries, 
and its advisers continue providing mine action expertise to 
governments supported by UNDP. The ad hoc relationship 
with GICHD has been particularly valuable, whereby GICHD 
provides technical expertise and relies on UNDP for country-
level access, support, and coordinated follow-up.
Information Management
Quality of data and reporting is vital to the credibility of 
the national mine action program. All mine action programs 
and operators endeavor to maintain good records of the dem-
ining work conducted and areas of suspected contamination. 
In the past, personnel used a simple spreadsheet or database, 
but complexity grew as the amount of data increased with 
1988–1997 1998–2004 2005–present
UN-Managed UNDP UN-Managed UNDP UN-Managed UNDP
Afganistan
Angola
Bosnia
Croatia
Mozambique
Northern Iraq
Angola
Bosnia
Cambodia
Lao PDR
Mozambique
Burundi
Cyprus
DR Congo
Iraq
Kosovo
Lebanon
Sudan
UNMEE
W. Sahara
Afghanistan
Albania
(Armenia)
Azerbaijan
Bosnia
Chad
Colombia
Croatia
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
(Iran)
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Mauritania
Senegal
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Thailand
(Ukraine)
Yemen
CAR
Chad
Colombia
Cote d’Ivoire
Darfur
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Nepal
OPT
Somalia
South Sudan
Algeria
Burundi
(Cyprus)
(Egypt)
(Liberia)
(Libya)
(Malawi)
(Pakistan)
(Rep. of Congo)
(Sudan)
(Uganda)
Vietnam
(Zambia)
(Zimbabwe)
Note: (Country) = Limited UNDP Support
Table 1. Initiation of UN-managed and UNDP-supported mine action programs. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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surveys of suspected hazardous areas (SHA), as well as with 
the introduction of GIS and mapping capabilities. Database 
and mapping tools developed during the 1990s due to the 
need to record the entirety of the landmine problem and the 
detail of site-specific operational work—with GICHD estab-
lishing the IMSMA for UNMAS. In many cases, IMSMA 
was installed in parallel with conducting a Landmine Impact 
Survey (LIS), although some existing programs were reluctant 
to replace their own database systems with IMSMA.4 GICHD 
provided the IMSMA software and training free of charge to 
mine action programs. As efforts were made to improve tech-
nical skills, IMSMA was used as the basis for strategic plan-
ning in response to the overall mine and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) problem.
Development of information-management systems with-
in government structures has been an especially difficult 
capacity-development challenge in many countries due to 
the difficulty of retaining qualified staff. The data quality 
and management of the system improved over time but was 
frequently interrupted by the loss of qualified personnel to 
better paying, private-sector career opportunities. These po-
sitions often received salary top-ups, and new technical per-
sonnel required fresh training on a continual basis. GICHD 
primarily provided technical support, with donor financing 
through UNDP. A continued need for technical and finan-
cial support for information management is likely, even with 
a well-established national mine action management entity. 
This is a long-term global challenge to maintain the special-
ized capacity required for mine action centers.
Lastly, in many programs when information-management 
systems were upgraded or a new baseline survey was conduct-
ed, previous data sets were set aside. For example, the 2015 
mine action database in Mozambique goes back to 2008, miss-
ing the information for demining conducted during the first 
15 years of the national program.  This greatly reduces its use-
fulness for long-term development and land-use planning, for 
which it would be valuable as a georeferenced data set simi-
lar to ones for hazardous waste and other environmental con-
tamination, flood plains, and earthquake hazards.
Strategic Planning and Prioritiz ation
The global mine action community recognizes the value of 
strategic planning as an essential element of effective nation-
al mine action programs. Previously, programs with annual 
operational plans began to develop strategies that assessed 
the known extent of the problem, considered the level of op-
erational activities necessary to resolve it, and projected the 
financial resources required to complete the task on time. 
The first plans were often produced with considerable input 
by international advisers, and in many cases, funded through 
UNDP. Over time, with more experience and better infor-
mation, later strategic plans were more realistic and included 
wider national and local participation. The process of prepar-
ing APMBC Article 5 extension requests has been an impor-
tant impetus to strengthen the quality and realism of national 
mine action plans.
Prioritization of land clearance tasks was a vital component 
of strategic planning. During the initial periods of peacekeep-
ing and humanitarian emergency programs, high-priority 
tasks were easy to discern, and less emphasis was placed on 
assessing the relative importance of second-tier sites for clear-
ance. Once emergency tasks were resolved, a large number of 
competing priorities with which to contend remained, bring-
ing increased importance to prioritization. However, there 
was little practical guidance:
* The APMBC set clearance deadlines but provided no 
prioritization.
* UNMAS published a suggested set of general priori-
ties in 1998 that included emergency assistance; set-
tled land with high civilian casualties; land required 
for resettlement of IDPs and refugees; land required 
for agriculture; community development; access to free 
operation of health services; and reconstruction and 
infrastructure.5
* Demining operators sought to maximize the efficiency 
of their teams and equipment, and prioritized factors 
such as physical and seasonal access as well as suitabil-
ity of minefields for available demining assets (climate, 
vegetation, topography, and nature of the landmine/
ERW contamination). For operators, safety and ease of 
use took precedence over the impact on beneficiary use 
of the land.
Landmine Impact Surveys and  
 Evidence-based Priority Setting
The introduction of LIS in the late 1990s was a deliberate 
effort to shift the practice of setting priorities based on mine-
field characteristics and operator capabilities to focusing on 
communities with socioeconomic problems caused by sus-
pected mined areas. UNDP (together with UNMAS, UNOPS, 
and the Survey Working Group) was an early promoter of LIS 
as a means to obtain more complete information, not only of 
suspected mined areas, but also of their socioeconomic im-
pacts on affected communities. LIS was carried out in heavily 
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A woman cultivates vegetables for consumption 
and market under Pylon 183.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.
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mine-affected countries between 1999 and 2006. LIS and oth-
er impact-assessment tools were introduced to ensure that as-
sets would have the greatest positive result for mine-affected 
communities. LIS increased the socioeconomic benefit of de-
mining by focusing greater demining resources on resolution 
of community problems. This was done at the expense of re-
ducing its operational efficiency by increasing the estimated 
size of SHAs for demining and increasing the frequency with 
which demining teams moved to address higher impact areas. 
While UNDP focused particular attention to higher socio- 
economic impact areas, national governments sought demin-
ing support for infrastructure, regardless of the level of exist-
ing local socioeconomic impact.
Experience has confirmed the merits of a two-tier approach 
to priority-setting for demining, with national prioritization 
at the broad category level of blocked resources (roads, mar-
kets, water ways, farmland), coupled with the selection of spe-
cific tasks based on local needs. UNDP-supported planning 
processes have in some cases overemphasized local priorities, 
with insufficient hazard evidence. To avoid this risk, the first 
operational response should be precise surveying rather than 
clearance. As evidence-based approaches to priority setting 
were applied in different countries, they resulted in increased 
numbers of mines removed per hectare cleared and a reduc-
tion in the percentage of tasks where no mines were found. 
This approach was advocated for some years by GICHD, 
UNDP, UNMAS, UNOPS, NGOs, and with the support of do-
nors. Over time, most programs developed a combined meth-
odology for priority setting—partly impact, partly technical, 
and partly prioritization by local authorities.
National Mine Action Standards  
 and Quality Management
National mine action standards (NMAS) form a critical 
part of the quality-management process, together with the 
operator-accreditation process, and the verification of cleared 
land. In countries where it has helped establish mine action 
programs, UNDP has supported the issuance of NMAS to 
guide the management and implementation process. In most 
countries the first NMAS were developed by an internation-
al technical adviser, who essentially adapted the IMAS (since 
2001) or other existing mine action program standards (be-
fore 2001) to the country in question. The resulting first stan-
dards were nearly always in English. Over time NMAS were 
revised and translated into national languages. Some revi-
sions consider national experience, although changes to glob-
al IMAS continue to drive most countries’ revisions.
UNDP Support of and Impact on Mine Action
During the evaluation-inception phase, the team identi-
fied possible impacts from demining on local communities: 
improvements in household income resulting from the abil-
ity to use previously contaminated land; reduction in time re-
quired to travel to markets and service centers due to use of 
more direct routes; and a reduced number of new mine vic-
tims. Given UNDP’s focus on marginalized populations, the 
team also sought to determine whether the benefits of demin-
ing were being captured by elites, for example with displace-
ment of poorer populations that previously had accepted risk 
and farmed or lived in hazardous areas.
The evaluation team identified these possible impacts, rec-
ognizing the gap between UNDP upstream activities and 
actual demining carried out by operators. UNDP support is 
usually several steps removed from direct impact on commu-
nities and can be considered effective to the extent its actions 
result in greater government focus, rule-setting, and man-
agement capacity. Respectively, these can positively affect 
the laws and procedures set in place for demining, prioritiza-
tion of areas for demining, and quality of demining results. 
Indeed, UNDP mine action support activities have many pos-
itive results: development of national statutes and demin-
ing strategies; trained deminers; stronger quality assurance; 
improved information management and greater understand-
ing of the landmine problem; more effective use of resources; 
less time spent on clearance of areas without mines; greater 
total areas cleared, etc. These are important results, yet the 
evaluation deliberately focused on downstream changes in 
the living conditions of the beneficiary population, and the 
team endeavored to find links between UNDP mine action 
work and perceived benefits to local communities.
Across the 24 communities visited in Laos, Mozambique, 
and Tajikistan, and based on evidence from interviews, focus 
group discussions, and documentary evidence, the main (per-
ceived) problems caused by mine/ERW contamination from 
the perspective of community members and local officials 
were
* The proximity of land contaminated with mines and 
ERW caused fear. People worried about themselves, 
their families (particularly children), livestock, and 
friends.
* Contamination interfered with freedom of movement, 
as mined roads affected the delivery of assistance and 
transport of goods, and contamination prevented chil-
dren from going to school on their own.
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* Contamination restricted access to natural resources, 
impeding the collection of firewood, mushrooms, me-
dicinal herbs, grass to make hay for animals in the win-
ter, and water for drinking and irrigation.
* Fear, restricted movement, and restricted access all led 
to reduced economic opportunity and well-being— 
especially for mine victims—with significant long-term 
repercussions, such as increased vulnerability and pov-
erty for those affected.
The principal impact on the community came from the 
broader sense of safety and ability to move freely throughout 
the area. When questioned about what had changed as a result 
of demining activity, local residents indicated they felt more 
secure and could “walk without fear.” In virtually all of the 
communities visited, the inhabitants (male and female) re-
ported significant safety improvements following clearance.
While community members believed that socioeconomic 
conditions at the community level had improved, the extent 
was highly variable and difficult to quantify. In most villag-
es visited, evidence indicated improved living standards as 
a result of the mine action effort. Community members ex-
pressed that they could resume their normal daily activities 
unimpeded, farming larger plots of land or existing plots 
more efficiently. Farmers, who previously worked contam-
inated fields cautiously, were able to dig deeper with their 
equipment and move faster across their land, accessing wa-
ter and other resources more easily. The observed economic 
improvements were primarily due to personal initiative rath-
er than specific economic development or job-creation assis-
tance from the government, the U.N. or NGOs to promote 
development following clearance.
Most community members who were interviewed report-
ed that besides immediate medical attention, no support was 
provided for mine survivors and their families. Community 
members stated that in the absence of victim support, the socio- 
economic conditions of mine survivors were consistently 
worse than they had been prior to the mine/ERW accident.
The evaluation did not find evidence that the release of pre-
viously contaminated land was a significant source of conflict. 
Although cleared land was generally put to use, it was not a 
new resource available for use by new claimants. In the coun-
tries visited, the families who traditionally used the land were 
known and continued to use the land before and after clear-
ance. Where this was not the case, there was an established 
Outcomes of the focus group discussion with beneficiaries on the impact of clearance, Asingtai (New) Village, Samouy District, 
Saravan Province, Laos.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Paul Davis.
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procedure to allocate new land, which was applied to cleared 
land. Short of a land-reform process, the evidence suggests 
that clearance in these countries has not created a new asset 
to be distributed at the will of the government (or of any in-
ternational actor). Although respondents in all three of the 
countries visited were aware of disputes over land, none of 
them reported that these disputes were related to cleared land.
Conclusion
The transition to national ownership of mine action in 
some countries aided by UNDP has been slow and incon-
sistent, and the sustainability of some nationally managed 
programs remains in question. In two of the three case 
countries, the national mine action entity remained UNDP 
projects until recently, despite decades of UNDP capacity-
building support.
UNDP has sought to mainstream gender in its mine action 
programming, particularly through calling attention to the 
U.N. Gender Guidelines for Mine Action and seeking support 
of the Gender and Mine Action Program hosted by GICHD. 
Basic integration of gender in mine action is widely accepted 
(e.g., surveys of women as well as men for information on sus-
pected areas; relevance of sex disaggregated data on mine vic-
tims). Nonetheless, little evidence shows that UNDP support 
in this area has transformed national mine action programs, 
and further efforts to improve gender equity are required.
The livelihood improvements evident after demining in 
the observed communities stemmed mostly from local ini-
tiatives, enabled by reduced risk and improved access or by 
specific programs sponsored by UNDP and national gov-
ernment partners. As mine action programs mature, they 
tend to become increasingly focused on poor rural commu-
nities confronted by a wide array of development chal-
lenges. Economic development and job-creation programs 
would benefit from including the requirements of such 
mine affected communities. 
See endnotes page 67
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Field Notes
 Emerging Patterns of  
ERW Injuries in Laos
by Stacey Pizzino [ University of Queensland ], Colette McInerney [ World Education Laos ], 
and Jo Durham, Ph.D. [ University of Queensland ]
The year 2016 marks the begin-ning of a new era for interna-
tional development, with the adoption 
of seventeen Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG) that will drive global de-
velopment efforts until 2030. In post-
conflict countries, humanitarian mine 
action will be an important enabler in 
achieving a number of SDGs, including 
goal 3: “ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all at all ages.” Of partic-
ular relevance is target 3.9 of the SDGs, 
which specifies the need to reduce the 
number of deaths and illnesses from soil 
pollution and contamination.1 At pres-
ent this relates primarily to indoor and 
outdoor air pollution. However, since 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) con-
tamination can be directly attributed to 
a significant number of deaths and inju-
ries in post-conflict countries, the inclu-
sion of ERW is relevant. Demonstrating 
mine action’s contribution to target 3.9 
requires accurate, reliable, and readily available ERW injury 
data, which will also allow for the appropriate allocation of 
resources to both ERW injury prevention and adequate access 
to emergency medical and rehabilitation services. As progress 
on goal 3 will be reported on through the health sector, SDGs 
provide an opportunity for mine action injury databases to 
link with national health information systems based on stan-
dardized, minimum reporting requirements for injuries using 
international standards, statistical principles, and global mea-
surement methods.
Laos is the most heavily bombed country in the world 
per capita, contending with extensive unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) contamination resulting from a heavy campaign of 
cluster munition bombings during the second Indo-China 
War.2 World Education, a nonprofit organization operating 
in Laos since 1992, works in nine of the most heavily contam-
inated provinces, particularly Xieng Khouang Province in 
northern Laos, to reduce the socioeconomic impact of ERW. 
Recognizing the need to enhance its analysis and use of ERW-
injury data, World Education Laos recently undertook an 
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Figure 1. Month of accident.
All graphics courtesy of authors.
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analysis of its ERW database and iden-
tified gaps for improvement. 
World Education Laos and the Laos 
provincial Departments of Health co-
implement the War Victims Medical 
Fund (WVMF) project, which supports 
the cost of complex treatments for ERW 
casualties. This article presents the de-
mographic and epidemiological pat-
terns of ERW injuries in the WVMF 
project database and provides recom-
mendations, which although specific to 
World Education’s victims database, are 
pertinent for other organizations’ work 
in the victims’ assistance sector. These 
recommendations analyze the demo-
graphics of ERW victims in Laos and 
target responses to their needs.
As part of the project, World 
Education maintains an Excel database 
that extracts patient data from the med-
ical registries of ERW patients. For this 
study, researchers processed the data 
for analysis by first identifying missing 
data, translating, and coding qualita-
tive variables (i.e., variables including: 
short explanation of cause of injury, di-
agnosis/injuries, and disabilities) from 
Lao to English, and giving each patient 
a unique identification code. The data 
from the Excel database was then im-
ported into the Statistical Package for 
the Social Science version 22 (SPSS) 
and statistical analyses were conducted. 
Notably, while World Education’s data-
base provides a rich source of informa-
tion, the findings of this study cannot be 
generalized beyond the areas in which 
World Education provides assistance to 
UXO survivors. Additionally, the data 
was only obtained from medical facili-
ties and may exclude patients who died 
before reaching care, whose injuries 
were too minor to seek medical care, 
or who used health services outside of 
World Education’s area of work.  
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Results
World Education has operated in Laos 
since 1992. Collection began in 1996 
when World Education commenced 
working with UXO survivors in Laos. 
The analysis included data from 1996 
through March 2015. The database con-
tained information on 1,013 UXO sur-
vivors from 12 different Lao provinces. 
Most of the survivors were from Xieng 
Khouang Province (N=706). Of the 307 
survivors originating from the 11 oth-
er provinces within the dataset (i.e., the 
northern provinces of Houaphan, Luang 
Prabang, Vientiane, and Xaisomboun; 
and the southern provinces of Attapeu, 
Bolikhamxay, Champasak, Khammoune, 
Saravane, Savannakhet, and Sekong), 
most originated from Savannakhet 
Province (N=142). 
Of all the UXO survivors included 
in the database, most UXO injuries oc-
curred between December and April, 
and resulted from burning fires to cook 
or keep warm in the colder months or 
from slash and burn agricultural prac-
tices. The least number of injuries were 
observed in July (Figure 1, page 54).
Age and Survival. Most of the in-
jured persons were male (79.3 per-
cent) with 45.2 percent 15 years old or 
younger (Figure 2, page 55). These find-
ings are similar to those reported in the 
2008 National Regulatory Authority 
of Lao PDR study and those con-
ducted elsewhere (e.g., Afghanistan, 
Chechnya).3,4,5 Although exposure 
to and injury from UXO may be less 
frequent for females, the 15-years-
or-younger-age group is still at an 
increased risk of injury, with the dis-
tribution of injuries across the lifespan 
highest for females in this age group.
The young adult and mature-age 
group (i.e., males and females over 15 
years old) represents the largest per-
centage of survivors. This age group is 
0−4
5−9
10−14
15−19
20−24
25−29
30−34
35−39
50−54
55−59
60−64
65−69
70−74
90−94
95−99
>100
85−89
80−84
75−79
45−49
40−44
Accident Age Grouped
Co
un
t
300
200
100
 0
Causes
Agriculture
Burning
Clearing fields
Cooking
Digging
Scrap Collection
Forest Activity
Playing
Walking
War Related
Other
Missing
Figure 4. Causes of injury by age group.
Causes
Agriculture
Burning
Clearing fields
Cooking
Digging
Scrap Collection
Forest Activity
Playing
Walking
War Related
Other
Missing
150
100
50
0
Co
un
t
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Missing
Month of Accident
Figure 5. Causes of injury by month.
56
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol20/iss3/1
57ISSUE 20.3 @ NOVEMBER 2016
particularly important as these years are potentially the most 
economically productive. Injuries and any consequent dis-
abilities may have substantial negative impact on social and 
economic factors for the individual, family, and community. 
Causes of Injury. As shown in Figure 3 (page 55), primary 
causes of UXO injury within the World Education database 
include burning (35.7 percent), playing (23.9 percent), digging 
(14.2 percent), and indirect injury associated with scrap col-
lection (9.7 percent). 
Burning accounted for 354 injuries, occurring more fre-
quently between the months of December through April 
(Figure 5, page 56). Coinciding with cooler periods of the year 
when people light fires to keep warm, this period is also the 
typical season for agricultural burning. Playing as a cause of 
injury (N=239) occurred across the year, regardless of sea-
son, predominately in children younger than 15 years old. 
Digging (N=137), which may be reflected in activities related 
to agriculture and digging in the surrounding fields, had the 
greatest impact on those between five and 29 years old, while 
five-to-19-year-olds were the age group most vulnerable to in-
jury as bystanders during scrap collection (N=95). Injuries di-
rectly related to agriculture (N=66) were most prominent in 
the 10-to-19-year-age group.
Discussion
Data collection, analysis, and reporting are fundamental 
to ensure accountable, efficient, and targeted programs that 
comprehensively meet the beneficiaries’ needs. The WVMF 
UXO survivor data provides a baseline for demographic and 
population health patterns within the operational provinces 
of World Education Laos, and establishes a context to improve 
the accuracy of health information at the organizational level. 
While the data findings cannot be generalized to the broader 
population, the patterns of injuries parallel findings from the 
National Regulatory Authority of the Lao PDR study. These 
findings also mirror those of other regions and conflicts (e.g., 
Afghanistan, Chechnya), indicating a reasonable level of con-
fidence in the credibility of the data.3,4
Future collection, analysis, and dissemination of health 
data relevant to mine action are required to meet the objec-
tives of the SDGs and the obligations of signatories of the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (i.e., Article 5), which calls 
for accurate data collection to assist victims.5 The most cost-
effective method to increase health data accuracy and meet 
SDG obligations would involve integration with other injury 
surveillance systems. As momentum builds within the inter-
national development community to meet the agenda of the 
SDGs, injury surveillance systems will likely be strengthened 
to meet specific injury-related goals (e.g., road traffic acci-
dents). This provides mine action players with the opportunity 
to standardize surveillance methods that can be linked to oth-
er injury surveillance systems. As the lead United Nations 
agency for mine action, the United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) within the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) should use this opportunity to enhance 
collaboration with other U.N. agencies such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO) to support countries reporting 
against SDG 3, leveraging these opportunities to ensure ap-
propriate recognition of mine action’s contribution to SDG 
3.9. This is important in both demonstrating the contribution 
of ERW injuries to the overall injury burden both globally and 
within individual countries, and in allowing the appropriate 
allocation of resources to ERW injury prevention, treatment, 
and rehabilitation. Finally, longitudinal studies are needed to 
fully understand the impact of ERW injuries. 
See endnotes page 67
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problem by developing multiple data collection and management 
systems. Over the past few years, several different standards for 
data exchange in the humanitarian domain were developed. 
The Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL) tries to collate 
data regarding humanitarian needs and response activities con-
ducted by a large number of humanitarian actors. HXL, inspired 
by social-media hashtags, is a simple standard that adds hashtags 
to spreadsheet headers to make it easier to share and compare hu-
manitarian data.1 maXML is a completely different approach since 
it converts user-entered data to XML structures and then shares 
them (by exporting/importing functionalities) with other com-
patible systems.
The Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL) is a col-
lection of XML-based messaging standards initiated by the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security and developed by the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards (OASIS).2 EDXL consists of different components that 
specify how to exchange data about distributions, resources, hos-
pital availability, situation reporting, and tracking of emergency 
patients. As the name suggests, EDXL was designed to speed up 
the direct communication between the different actors in an im-
mediate emergency (e.g., when an ambulance quickly needs to 
find a hospital nearby that can accept a patient). maXML, in con-
trast, focuses on standardizing and streamlining data reporting 
in long-term humanitarian operations. It provides a method to 
track information such as affected population, education provid-
ed, quality management (QM), clearance activities, etc.
The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is an 
effort that targets the transparency of development aid spend-
ing.3 It consists of an XML schema for describing an organiza-
tion involved in any stage development cooperation (funding, 
implementing, etc.) and an XML schema for describing the details 
of individual development cooperation activities and projects. 
maXML goes beyond organizations and activities and focuses also 
on affected populations and victims, education and victim assis-
tance provided, land clearance activities performed, etc.
maXML: COORDINATING MINE ACTION 
WITH XML TECHNOLOGIES
by Dionysia Kontotasiou and Olivier Cottray [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
T he Mine Action XML (maXML) is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) schema developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD). It aims to standardize data management and data ex-
change among actors in the mine action community, which in-
cludes individuals and groups involved in any aspect of addressing 
the landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamina-
tion. In this field, data exchange is mostly manual and often has 
to deal with chaotic environments. The goal of maXML is to con-
tribute to the automatization of many of these processes, saving 
valuable time for staff in the ﬁeld and improving the information 
ﬂow for decision makers who have to allocate resources for land 
clearance activities. The maXML vocabulary provides a formal 
deﬁnition of the terminology used in this domain and an initial 
set of tools and services that produce and consume maXML data. 
Provided by the GICHD as an information management sys-
tem, the maXML schema was originally created in 2002 by iden-
tifying data that members of the mine action community were 
interested in sharing. This was done through interviews and by re-
viewing various mine action information systems, standards, and 
processes. Since then, maXML has been further developed by add-
ing vocabulary that reflects the developments of the data in the 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The 
rationale behind the exchange format was to allow each organiza-
tion to retain their established data management practices but still 
facilitate data sharing with GICHD and other collaborators. The 
problem maXML addresses is facilitating data exchange between 
humanitarian actors in a way so that (a) data can be accessed in 
a standardized way, (b) standardized terminology and identifiers 
for commonly used entities can be defined, and (c) the use of those 
identifiers is supported at the time of reporting.
RELATED WORK
Data exchange between different actors has been a challenge 
both for GICHD and the humanitarian field as a whole. GICHD 
and other organizations tried to address different aspects of this 
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The Geography Markup Language (GML) is a version of XML 
that handles geographic features and enables open format com-
munication of geographic data. In 2006, the Croatian Mine Action 
Center (CROMAC) coordinated with Geofoto LLC to develop a 
geoinformation system used for a digital visualization and analysis 
of geographic features and events.4 maXML is a broader XML sche-
ma since it provides additional information on top of the geo data.
The Ushahidi Platform uses the Management Of A Crisis 
(MOAC) vocabulary and collects and visualizes information 
while enabling interactive mapping.5,6 It allows individuals to 
share their stories on their own terms, using the tools they already 
have. Instead of being a story-telling platform, maXML followed 
another direction and is considered an XML schema to share and 
exchange data in mine action.    
DATA EXCHANGE IN THE MINE ACTION ECOSYSTEM
Mine action is inherently geographic, and activities are usu-
ally associated to geographic areas undergoing a series of other 
activities, all of which aim to release previously hazardous areas 
for productive use. Related mine action processes that require data 
collection and management include non-technical survey, techni-
cal survey, clearance, collecting casualty data, and mine risk edu-
cation (MRE). 
Within countries, these activities are usually carried out by 
different organizations reporting to a national mine action cen-
ter (NMAC) or other national authority. This induces a data flow 
from several different actors into a central entity. The NMAC 
is an organization that, on behalf of the National Mine Action 
Authority (NMAA), is responsible for the planning, coordination, 
overseeing, and implementation of mine action projects. For na-
tional mine action programs, the NMAC acts as the operational 
office of the NMAA.
IMSMA is traditionally deployed and used at the NMAC or 
NMAA level. The information gathered during mine action opera-
tions is reported by the implementing organizations to the NMAC. 
Typically, data is sent in any format (e.g., paper, spreadsheet, or via 
Figure 1. IMSMA Architecture.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.
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replace existing information management systems but rather fo-
cus on interoperability between existing systems. A standard way 
of describing and encoding operational humanitarian data can 
achieve this interoperability; however, a standard alone is not ad-
equate to solve the problem. 
PROPOSED SOLUTION
After analyzing these requirements, a solution based on XML 
was identified as the most promising. An XML vocabulary for the 
domain provides a sound definition of the most important do-
main concepts. The first step towards maXML was the definition 
of the vocabulary, which is described in the following section.
maXML VOCABULARY
Developed to annotate humanitarian data, the maXML sche-
ma syntax conforms to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
Recommendation (October 6, 2000) for XML 1.0. The current 
version of the vocabulary focuses on quantitative information 
digital mobile data collection tools) to the NMAC, where the data 
is entered into IMSMA. Alternatively, the implementing organi-
zations have access to IMSMA and enter information that can be 
imported into the NMAC’s system.
REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION
The primary requirement for maXML is that it addresses the 
fundamental information management problem described previ-
ously: maXML must make the compilation of a common oper-
ational picture more efficient. The identification of this problem 
comes from the experiences of information managers who have 
worked in multiple MACs over the last several years.
In solving this fundamental problem, proposed solutions must 
not significantly increase the reporting burden already imposed 
on humanitarian actors. Ideally, solutions should reduce burdens 
by only requiring that organizations report data once and in a way 
that serves the diversity of users, from operational partners to an-
alysts at the global level. To be successful, solutions should not 
Figure 2. IMSMA graphical user interface.
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that can be directly used to generate reports, maps, and inter-
active dashboards. The main sections of the vocabulary are pre-
sented by topic:
Geolocation. Provides the elements to annotate geographic in-
formation. It builds on the Open Geospatial Consortium’s (OGC) 
Simple Features model and extends it. This approach ensures that 
all maXML data is fully compliant with OGC and hence support 
complex spatial queries in a standardized way. 
Activity. Conveys information pertaining to the technical sur-
vey activity, the area in which the activity was conducted, the re-
sult of the activity (data collected as part of a technical survey), 
and other relevant information.
Victim Assistance. Defines the elements required to publish 
data about the populations affected by landmines and the assis-
tance received by different organizations. The elements in this 
section correspond to the humanitarian profile, breaking down 
the person by the way in which the corresponding populations 
are affected (victim, direct beneficiaries, victim assistance, etc.). 
In addition, the various organizations involved in assistance 
activities—including name, abbreviation, and internal ID—are 
defined here.
Education and Quality Management. Contains the elements to 
describe the MRE and QM involved in land release activities. 
Ordnance. Describes hazardous devices, their characteris-
tics and technical details such as effect, case color, case mate-
rial, detectability, diameter, dimension, explosive component 
weight, fuze method, transportation, etc. The main source is the 
Collaborative ORDnance Data Repository (CORD).7
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Reusing existing vocabularies is a central principle to ensure in-
teroperability. However, in the context of maXML, special care is 
taken to ensure that any existing vocabularies still used by actors 
are stable and that the definitions of concepts correspond exactly 
to those used in the mine action context. These points constrained 
the number of potential vocabularies to reuse considerably. An el-
ement such as country could be taken from existing vocabularies. 
However, when maXML is specified, no definition that includes 
nations along with dependent territories was found. 
From a technical perspective, the vocabulary is divided into 
thematic sections as introduced in the previous subsection. This 
makes the vocabulary more tractable and allows for the automatic 
generation of a well-structured documentation for the vocabulary. 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
In recent years, IMSMA expanded and evolved in order to meet 
the requirements of international humanitarian standards and 
the general developments of mine action. This process progressed 
quickly so the definition of maXML specifications and their docu-
mentation has lagged behind. As a result, maXML became an in-
ternal protocol rather than a well-known one. 
Since the expansion and evolvement trend is expected to con-
tinue, the GICHD decided to review the current maXML situation 
and determine the future sustainability of the protocol. 
The updated protocol should be capable of
• coping with current expansion of IMSMA
• coping with future expansion of IMSMA in relation to 
Figure 3. D-BOX: Interoperability with maXML.
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international humanitarian law such as the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM), Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(CCW), and other domains such as small arms and light 
weapons (SA/LW) and armed violence reduction (AVR).
• ensuring data interoperability within the domain of the hu-
manitarian sector
• ensuring that the data interoperability would not be re-
stricted to a specific information management system.
Three different solutions to update maXML were proposed:
• Basic solution was a description of minimal changes to 
maXML to bring it up to date with current XML standards 
without causing any major changes on IMSMA
• Intermediate solution was a description of changes to 
maXML that would increase the interoperability with other 
systems, while having  some effect on IMSMA
• Advanced solution was a description of the full update 
of the maXML structure, while possibly leading to major 
changes in IMSMA.
GICHD is in the process of selecting one of these solutions.
DATA CONSUMPTION
The maXML schema is driven by the need to be able to repur-
pose data into products that support many users. Humanitarian 
actors need a solid basis for planning their activities, donors want 
to prioritize projects to allocate funds, and media and academ-
ics need up-to-date information for articles on scientific studies, 
hence the need for machine readable data. 
CURRENT USES OF maXML
D-BOX is a project funded by the European Union to develop 
a set of tools in support of the mine action community and can 
access information from a wide variety of sources. Among these, 
D-BOX can import data from IMSMA in maXML format and is 
intended to develop maXML export capability as well. The sepa-
rate planning and operations tools can exchange information be-
tween each other, and there is a specific tool (D-BOX for sharing) 
developed for sharing between separate installations of D-BOX 
(e.g., between different countries or regions). This data exchange is 
implemented through the transfer of MediaWiki pages.
The TIRAMISU Information Management System (T-IMS) is 
another project funded by the European Union for humanitari-
an demining. The tool aims at receiving, collecting, and gather-
ing tasks and reports, and compiling, analyzing, presenting, and 
communicating all relevant field data. T-IMS uses maXML as a 
communication protocol, internally and externally, and for the 
definition of information elements as well as user input. All com-
munication to and from T-IMS is done via maXML. GICHD has 
been in touch with the developing company in order to ensure 
compatibility with IMSMA through the maXML import and 
export functionality. 
The Mine Action Reporting System (MARS), developed by 
GICHD, is one example of a recently developed mobile data collec-
tion tool falling under the IMSMA applications category. MARS 
comprises three main parts: a field data entry mobile app (MARS 
Mobile), a web-based data management and administration portal 
(MARS Web), and cloud-based data storage (MARS Cloud). After 
Figure 4. T-IMS: Exporting maXML data.
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initial configuration via MARS Web, authorized users can collect 
data in the field via custom developed data entry forms or forms 
designed in IMSMA and imported into MARS. The mobile appli-
cation allows capturing GPS information identifying points and 
polygons with a few finger taps. As soon as the mobile device is 
connected to the internet, the collected data is synchronized with 
the MARS Cloud and made accessible for approval via the web 
portal. Finally, data collected via MARS can be imported into the 
IMSMA data repository.
FUTURE WORK
As a standard for exchanging operational data in mine action, 
maXML formalizes established terminology from the domain. 
It currently focuses on humanitarian profile data as well as core 
reference data, such as geographic information, ordnances, edu-
cation, and quality management. Data according to the maXML 
vocabulary can currently be produced using the IMSMA soft-
ware. maXML data already drive the first applications, including 
D-BOX, T-IMS, and MARS. 
Defining the maXML vocabulary for the humanitarian system 
as a whole clearly goes beyond the capabilities and expertise of 
GICHD. In order to achieve this goal, the involvement of the glob-
al clusters in developing their respective components, such as vo-
cabulary extensions and cluster-specific tools, is required. In order 
to increase interoperability with systems and communities out-
side of the humanitarian domain, maXML should be aligned with 
existing standard vocabularies. 
See endnotes page 67
Figure 5. MARS-IMSMA integration via maXML.
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Issue 21.1 
Publication: March 2017
SPOTLIGHT
Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years On
Following the end of the Bosnian War in 
December 1995 and the Balkan floods 
of May 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
continues to suffer from landmines and 
explosive remnants of war contamination. 
The Journal is seeking articles on lessons 
learned and remaining challenges for 
ongoing programs in the region.
Issue 21.2 
Publication: July 2017
SPOTLIGHT
Southeast Asia
How are international NGOs and national 
mine action operators in Southeast Asia ad-
dressing threats? What has changed in the 
way data is collected and analyzed? What 
lessons learned can be shared with the 
broader CWD community?
Of particular interest are Burma, Cambodia, 
Laos, Nepal, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Issue 21.3
Publication: November 2017
SPOTLIGHT
Western Hemisphere
How have negotiations between govern-
ments and nonstate armed groups affected 
the demining process in Central and South 
America? What lessons learned can be tak-
en from the ongoing demining operations 
conducted by military forces and their col-
laboration with newly accredited civilian 
deminers? 
The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction is sponsored by
of Conventional Weapons Destruction
THEJOURNAL
call for papers
http://www.jmu.edu/CISR
improving lives since 1996.
Visit our website for
• Calls for papers
• Past issues 
• Subscribe 
Submit all materials to:
Managing Editor
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University
Email: cisr-journal@jmu.edu
FEATURE
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) 
& Pressure Plate IEDs
As the number one cause of military casu-
alties, IEDs are one of the greatest threats 
to civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and 
Syria, and becoming an increasing threat in 
Europe, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. How are traditional humanitarian 
CWD programs dealing with the increas-
ing prevalence of  IEDs  and pressure plate 
IEDs?  
FEATURE
Evolving Nature of Survey  
and Mobile Technologies
How has the prevalence of mobile technol-
ogy changed the survey documentation 
process? What are some of the successes 
and challenges faced by CWD organizations 
when conducting surveys? How is the scope 
of a country’s contamination measured? 
How is quality assurance measured prior to 
land release?
FEATURE
Physical Security and Stockpile 
Management (PSSM)
What are the most common challenges 
faced by organizations attempting to curb 
the spread of illicit small arms and light 
weapons? What lessons learned can be 
shared with the broader community? Po-
tential topics relating to PSSM include am-
munition disposal, stockpile management, 
surplus reduction, improved marking and 
tracing capabilities, and the destruction of 
illicit and obsolete SA/LW.
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